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For over thirty years, there has been an ongoing debate over the continued 
viability of the personal and corporate income tax systems and the need for 
change.1  Several governments—including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and Sweden—have conducted studies considering the 
merits of changing their current income tax systems to systems based on a cash 
flow, consumption-style tax.2  To date, not one country has replaced its income 
                                                 
 + Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University. 
 1. William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1113–22 (1974) (providing one of the earliest accounts of the possible 
advantages of a consumption-style tax). 
 2. THE INST. FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION 
33–45 (1978) (comparing ways to reform the tax system of the United Kingdom including a 
discussion of measuring one’s tax base through consumption) [hereinafter THE MEADE REPORT]; 
SVEN-OLOF LODIN, PROGRESSIVE EXPENDITURE TAX—AN ALTERNATIVE?  A REPORT OF THE 
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tax with a direct consumption tax.3 
Several concrete proposals have been proffered for replacing the income tax 
with cash flow or consumption taxes.4  In the United States, Robert Hall and 
Alvin Rabushka—the pioneers of this field—proposed a uniform flat rate tax 
on all businesses, which would allow for an immediate deduction for all costs, 
including wages, and a uniform flat tax rate on wages received by individuals.5  
Other popular consumption tax proposals include the Unlimited Savings 
Allowance (USA) tax system6 and the Business Activities Tax (BAT).7  The 
                                                                                                                 
1972 GOVERNMENT COMMISSION ON TAXATION 21–29 (1978) (providing a discussion of the 
arguments for and against implementing an expenditure tax in the Swedish tax system); REPORT 
OF COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO INFLATION AND TAXATION 464–68 (1975) (discussing a 
proposal for a cash flow concept tax system in Australia) [hereinafter MATHEWS COMM. 
REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 9–15 (1977) 
(discussing potential reforms to the United States’ federal income tax by presenting, among other 
ideas, a model for a cash flow consumption tax) [hereinafter BASIC TAX REFORM]. 
 3. CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR. & GEORGE E. ZODROW, CONSUMPTION-BASED DIRECT 
TAXES: A GUIDED TOUR OF THE AMUSEMENT PARK 3 (2007) (reporting on several countries that 
considered cash flow direct taxes but did not adopt them). 
 4. See, e.g., DAVID E. BRADFORD, FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN CONSUMPTION TAXATION  
5–18 (1996) (proposing a consumption tax in the form of a value-added tax and discussing its 
relationship to income tax); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an 
Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk?  Does It Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV. 377, 
392–403 (1992) (discussing whether a consumption tax is risky and potentially unfair); Michael J. 
Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1575–77,  
1584–97 (1979) (describing a consumption tax as more economically efficient and outlining its 
general structure); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much Capital Taxed Under an Income Tax Is 
Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 TAX L. REV. 1, 2–15 (1996) (comparing four methods for 
exempting capital income within a cash flow tax system) [hereinafter How Much Capital Taxed]; 
Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 
1093–1121 (1980) (discussing several factors that make a consumption tax fairer than an income 
tax, including utility, discrimination towards savers, and the defectiveness of measuring income). 
 5. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed., Hoover Institutional 
Press 1995).   
 6. The USA system suggests a flat-rate business tax on domestic gross profits and a 
graduated individual tax, which permits savings deductions.  Alliance USA, Unlimited Savings 
Allowance (USA) Tax System, 66 TAX NOTES 1482, 1487–90 (1995). 
 7. The BAT replaces the corporate income tax with a consumption-style tax while 
retaining the individual income tax.  OFFICE OF TAX POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY 19–37 (2007) [hereinafter THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY].  The BAT is essentially 
a value-added tax (VAT) that differs from the European-style VAT—which uses a tax credit 
method—by taxing added value using the subtraction method.  Id. at 20–21, 37.  The BAT was 
originally supported by Senators John Danforth and David Boren and was re-proposed by the 
Bush Administration in a 2007 Treasury Study.  See George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowski, 
Introduction: The Fundamental Question in Fundamental Tax Reform, in UNITED STATES TAX 
REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowski eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter TAX REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY].  Although this Article focuses on direct 
consumption taxes like sales taxes or VATs, the BAT is mentioned here because the Treasury 
recommendation was that the BAT would replace the income tax on businesses.  THE 2007 
TREASURY STUDY, supra, at 19. 
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primary argument in favor of replacing income taxes with consumption taxes is 
that there would be a dramatic increase in national productivity,8 but many 
scholars vigorously contest the estimated level of economic growth that would 
result.9 
Economic models have shed considerable light on the relative merits of 
income versus consumption taxation; nevertheless, these models do have 
limitations.10  Most models assume a closed economy, which ignores the 
tremendous impact world trade and capital flows have on the merits, design, 
and implementation of income and consumption taxes.11  Even those models 
that try to simulate an open economy employ an over-simplified view of the 
tax treatment of foreign source income and thus do not adequately address the 
complexities of taxes in an economically open, highly competitive world.12  
Finally, these comparative models—simulating both an open and closed 
economy—assume an ideal income tax, which is quite different from our 
present system.13  Consequently, analytical completeness demands a different 
perspective on the subject. 
This different point of view is a global perspective and it serves as the 
central focus of this Article.  A global perspective analyzes tax regimes that 
must deal with worldwide economic forces of free trade, competitive capital 
markets, and the increasing mobility of many factors of production.14  A global 
perspective starts with the reality of an open economy, not one that is closed.15  
Instead of taking a purely theoretical economic perspective, a global 
perspective takes account of the actual, imprecise laws of nations regarding the 
ever-changing flows of international transactions.16  Analysis must also 
confront the reality that nations compete for mobile economic activity through 
the use of tax incentives.17  Not surprisingly, viewing the relative merits of 
                                                 
 8. THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 19; Zodrow & Mieszkowski, supra note 
7, at 2–3. 
 9. See Zodrow & Mieszkowski, supra note 7, at 2–6. 
 10. See, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle, Behavioral Responses to a Consumption Tax, in TAX 
REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 7, at 25–28. 
 11. See Charles L. Ballard, International Aspects of Fundamental Tax Reform, in TAX 
REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 7, at 109–10, 132–38 (comparing outcomes from 
“Closed-Economy Simulation Models,” which are frequently used, and “Open-Economy 
Simulation Models,” which are used less frequently). 
 12. See id. at 134–38; see also Gravelle, supra note 10, at 42. 
 13. See Ballard, supra note 11, at 132–38. 
 14. See William B. Barker, International Tax Reform Should Begin at Home: Replace the 
Corporate Income Tax with a Territorial Expenditure Tax, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 647, 647 
(2010). 
 15. See Ballard, supra note 11, at 132–38. 
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
 17. See William B. Barker, Optimal International Taxation and Tax Competition: 
Overcoming the Contradictions, 22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 161, 172 (2002) (providing an 
account of the effect of tax competition on nations’ tax systems). 
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income and consumption taxes from a global perspective yields different 
insights and conclusions. 
This different perspective indicates that serious consideration should be 
given to adopting a cash flow, consumption-style, or expenditure-type tax on 
corporations and other large businesses.  Limiting a cash flow tax to 
corporations and other large businesses distinguishes this Article from other 
popular proposals because it leaves intact the personal income tax on wages, 
earnings, and capital income of individuals.18  For instance, the proposed cash 
flow tax differs from a value added tax, such as the BAT, in that it allows the 
deduction of labor costs.19  In addition, this new global perspective prompts the 
adoption of a destination-based, cash flow tax contrary to other popular 
consumption-type, origin-based taxes.20 
This Article is divided into four parts.  Part I deals with the practical 
problems of income taxation of corporations and what makes reform of the 
corporate income tax system formidable.  Part II sets out the elements of a cash 
flow tax and illustrates how a cash flow tax remedies the inadequacies of an 
income tax.  This Part also discusses the virtues of a destination-based cash 
flow tax as compared to other tax proposals.  Part III explores the economic 
differences between income and cash flow taxes and demonstrates how these 
systems approach the taxation of capital income on a practical level.  Part IV 
explains why a cash flow tax on only corporations is justified considering 
efficiency, justice, and politics as well as how a cash flow tax works in concert 
with an income tax on individuals. 
I.  THE DEFICIENCIES OF A CORPORATE INCOME TAX 
The corporate income tax has been in continuous operation in the United 
States for over 100 years.21  Recently, however, the executive branch has made 
corporate tax reform a priority.22  President Obama’s corporate tax proposal 
provides for broadening the corporate tax base by eliminating various tax 
deductions and credits attributable to loopholes while concurrently lowering 
the statutory corporate tax rate.23  There are two main goals of this reform.  
                                                 
 18. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 19. See THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 19. 
 20. See, e.g., HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 5, at 53–64; THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 
2, at 33–37 (proposing origin-based cash flow taxes); see also infra Part II.B (discussing the 
similarities and differences between an origin-based and a destination-based cash flow tax). 
 21. Tariff Act of Aug. 5 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112–13.  The 1909 Act imposed a 
special tax of 1% of net income above $5,000 for all corporations, joint stock companies, or 
associations, including foreign entities engaged in business in the United States.  Id. 
 22. See Eric Kroh, Obama Asks Business Leaders to Aid Corporate Tax Reform Efforts, 130 
TAX NOTES 745, 745 (2011) (reporting President Obama’s recent efforts to engage the business 
community on tax reform). 
 23. See THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM, A JOINT REPORT BY 
THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 9–10 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 
JOINT REPORT] (outlining these proposals).  
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The first goal is to simplify the system and substantially reduce the burden of 
tax compliance, which currently costs corporations approximately 40 billion 
dollars per year or 12% of revenues collected.24  The second goal is to increase 
the competitive posture of American companies at home and abroad by 
lowering tax rates and decreasing the costs of accessing new capital.25  
President Obama’s underlying objective is to accomplish these goals in a 
revenue-neutral fashion, thus requiring the effects of lower rates to be offset by 
a broader tax base, achieved primarily through the elimination of tax 
preferences.26 
Businesses voicing an opinion on the suggested reforms have reacted in a 
predictable way, wishing to preserve current tax incentives while approving 
rate reduction.27  The reason is obvious: tax preferences affect various 
enterprises differently and reforms would produce substantial winners and 
losers.  A recent study indicates that if all major tax expenditures other than 
accelerated depreciation were eliminated, Congress would be able to lower the 
corporate tax rate from 35% to 28%.28  One study found, however, that this 
reduction could provide as much as a 12.3% decrease in taxes to some 
industries and as great as a 69.7% increase to others.29 
Substantial base broadening with a lower rate would be a significant 
achievement, simplifying the corporate tax code and eliminating some reasons 
for tax planning, which would produce savings in compliance costs for 
corporations.30  The case for enhancing the competitiveness of U.S. enterprises 
is obscure, however, because as long as the reform is revenue neutral, the 
amount of taxes paid by corporations will, in itself, have little effect on overall 
                                                 
 24. Id. at 3–4, 65. 
 25. Id. at 69–72. 
 26. See id.; see also Kroh, supra note 22, at 745 (“In a speech at the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, . . . [President] Obama argued that the federal government’s interests are aligned with 
those of business owners and that revenue-neutral corporate tax reform would be of mutual 
benefit.”). 
 27. See Kroh, supra note 22, at 745 (noting that in private meetings with administration 
officials, some business leaders have requested that overall corporate tax rate cuts not be offset by 
the elimination of tax subsidies). 
 28. See 2012 JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 9–10 (noting the top federal tax rate of 35%); 
see also Martin A. Sullivan, Winners and Losers in Corporate Tax Reform, 130 TAX NOTES 731, 
731 (2011) (citing THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 48–49); infra text accompanying 
note 39 (describing accelerated depreciation). 
 29. Sullivan, supra note 28, at 733 tbl.2A.  The five greatest winners would be securities, 
insurance, credit intermediation, retail trade, and bank holding companies.  Id.  The five biggest 
losers would be electrical products, transport equipment, computers and electronics, technical 
services, and agriculture.  Id. 
 30. See 2012 JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 9–10. 
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competitiveness.31  Further, many tax incentives are aimed at enhancing the 
competitiveness of U.S. businesses internationally.32   
A different goal of corporate tax reform should be to restructure the tax in a 
way that would provide a source of sustainable revenue to the government, 
especially in times of large public deficits, such as the current situation.  
Although the United States has one of the highest statutory corporate tax rates, 
the current corporate tax system does not result in comparatively high 
corporate tax revenues.33  Between 2000 and 2005, the United States’ 
corporate tax revenue was only 2.2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
whereas OECD countries averaged 3.5%.34  The United States’ corporate tax 
revenue has decreased as a share of U.S. GDP from a high of 4.5% in the  
mid-1960s,35 despite the fact that overall tax revenues have increased from 
nearly 25% of GDP to approximately 28% of GDP between 1965 and 1998.36  
These low figures for corporate tax revenues are surprising when related to the 
level of control that corporations exercise over the national economy.  In 2008, 
receipts from all businesses in the United States exceeded thirty-four trillion 
dollars.37  Of these receipts, over twenty-eight trillion dollars were attributable 
to corporations alone, resulting in corporations representing 84% of all 
receipts.38 
                                                 
 31. See infra notes 48–59 and accompanying text. 
 32. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 199, 861, 863 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (providing tax deductions for 
domestic production and manufacturing activities and special rules regarding the reporting of 
inventory property sales); Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3 (outlining the inventory property sales source 
rules); see also 2012 JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 13–14. 
 33. See THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 6–10. 
 34. Id. at 10. 
 35. OECD, TAX POLICY STUDIES NO. 6, TAX AND THE ECONOMY, A COMPARATIVE 
ASSESSMENT OF OECD COUNTRIES 13 fig.2 (2001). 
 36. Id. 
 37. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TABLE 1. NUMBER OF RETURNS, TOTAL RECEIPTS, 
BUSINESS RECEIPTS, NET INCOME (LESS DEFICIT), NET INCOME, AND DEFICIT BY FORM OF 
BUSINESS, TAX YEARS 1980–2008 [hereinafter IRS TABLE 1]. 
 38. The exact figures for 2008 were $34,608,202,747,000 in total receipts for all businesses, 
with $28,589,771,221,000 attributable to just corporations.  Id.  The Bureau of Economic 
Analysis reached similar results. 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Domestic Business      8,687.5*      9,336.8      9,511.4      9,490.4      8,958.2 
Corporate Business      6,435.0     6,897.4     6,992.2     6,907.5      6,655.7 
Percentage 74.1% 73.9% 73.5% 73.4% 74.3% 
 
* All numbers billions. 
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, NATIONAL ECONOMIC ACCOUNTS, 
TABLE 1.13, NATIONAL INCOME BY SECTOR, LEGAL FORM OF ORGANIZATIONS AND TYPE OF 
INCOME (2011). 
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A 2007 U.S. Department of the Treasury study attributed the low yield, in 
part, to the narrowness of the corporate tax base created by certain tax 
preferences, such as deductions for domestic production and manufacturing 
activities, research and experimentation credits, allowing immediate expensing 
deductions for some capital costs, and accelerated depreciation.39  The study 
estimated that the total corporate revenue offset by tax preferences alone was 
$932 billion over ten years.40  This reduction in corporate net income 
represents 8.6% of net taxable corporate income for 2007.41  If the 
government’s goal was to increase revenue from corporations instead of 
maintaining revenue neutrality, eliminating tax preferences would be a step in 
the right direction.  Although tax preferences account for a part of low 
corporate tax yield, the decline in corporate tax revenues is also the result of 
four other critically important factors.   
The first important factor is the availability of pass-through tax alternatives 
to the traditional C corporate form.42  These alternatives include subchapter S 
corporations, limited liability entities, and partnerships.43  The use of these 
alternatives has increased dramatically over the years.  In 1980, approximately 
87% of U.S. business measured by receipts was in C corporations, with 
approximately 3% in S corporations and 4% in partnerships (including limited 
liability companies).44  By 2008, C corporations’ share of receipts was 
substantially reduced in favor of pass-through entities; C corporations 
accounted for only 63%, whereas S corporations (17.7%) and partnerships 
(13.6%) greatly increased their shares.45  Extending the corporate tax to large 
non-corporate business enterprises could substantially reverse this trend. 
                                                 
 39. THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 47–48. 
 40. Id. at 48 tbl.3.1. 
 41. This is found by dividing $93.2 billion by the C corporation 2008 net of $1.078770 
trillion.  See IRS TABLE 1, supra note 37, at 44. 
 42. Corporations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=98240,00.html (last visited Jul. 13, 2012) 
(describing a C corporation, which “is recognized as a separate taxpaying entity”); see also 2012 
JOINT REPORT supra note 23, at 7 (discussing the differing tax structures for a traditional C 
corporation and other businesses, such as sole proprietorships, partnerships, and S corporations). 
 43. S Corporations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=98263,00.html (last visited Jul. 13, 2012)  
(“S corporations are corporations that elect to pass corporate income, losses, deductions, and 
credit[s] through to their shareholders for federal tax purposes.”); see also 2012 JOINT REPORT, 
supra note 23, at 7. 
 44. The figures for 1980 are C corporations: 6,133,036,929,000 in total receipts out of 
7,064,487,840,000 total receipts for all businesses; S corporations: 210,322,424,000 in total 
receipts out of 7,064,487,840,000 for all businesses; and Partnerships: 291,998,115,000 in total 
receipts out of 7,064,487,840,000 for all businesses.  IRS TABLE 1, supra note 37. 
 45. The figures for 2008 are C corporations: 21,914,035,420,00 in total receipts out of 
34,608,202,747,000 for all businesses; S corporations: 6,126,386,899 in total receipts out of 
34,608,202,747,000 for all businesses; and Partnerships: 4,700,988,521,000 out of 
34,608,202,747,000 for all businesses.  Id. 
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The other three important factors do not involve loopholes, but involve 
critical systemic problems of the corporate income tax.  The second important 
factor, the deductibility of interest on debt, plays a large role in reducing the 
corporate tax base.46  Although the United States has one of the highest 
statutory corporate tax rates in the world, the impact of the statutory rate is 
misleading in large part due to the deduction of interest.47  The true measure of 
taxation is the Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR).48  A 2007 international 
study showed the United States’ EMTR in comparison with other countries 
was as follows: 
 
TABLE I
Country 
Statutory 
Corporate 
Income Tax 
Rate* 
Present 
Discounted 
Value of 
Depreciation 
Allowance-
Equipment 
(Equity) 
Effective 
Marginal Tax 
Rate – 
Equipment 
(Equity) 
Effective 
Marginal Tax 
Rate –
Equipment 
(Debt) 
United States 39 79 24 -46 
OECD Average 31 75 20 -32 
G-7 Average 36 76 24 -39 
* Includes local corporate taxes.49 
 
According to the original data in 2005, U.S. corporations were actually taxed 
less than their G-7 competitors.50  Table I shows that the U.S. average tax on 
                                                 
 46. See 2012 JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 5 (“[I]nterest paid by businesses (both 
corporate and non-corporate) is deductible . . . .  The current system therefore results in high 
effective tax rates on equity-financed investments and low effective rates on  
debt-financed investment.  This provides incentives for businesses to finance new investments 
with debt, and to maintain a higher level of debt in their capital structure, increasing the 
likelihood of financial distress and bankruptcy.”); see also infra Part I.A. 
 47. See 2012 JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 19–20 (noting the United States’ top statutory 
federal corporate tax rate of 35%, which, combined with the state corporate tax rates, creates a 
39% overall top statutory corporate tax rate).  At the time of the 2007 Treasury Study, the United 
States was second only to Japan for OECD countries, which had a 40% corporate tax rate.  See 
THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 6. 
 48. See THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 8 (noting the inaccuracies of the 
statutory corporate tax rate as compared to the EMTR, which “combines corporate tax rates, 
depreciation allowances, and other features of the tax system into a single measure of the share of 
an investment’s economic income needed to cover taxes over its lifetime”). 
 49. Id. at 7 tbl.1.1 (citing Corporate Tax Database, INST. FOR FISCAL STUDIES (2005), 
http://www.ifs.org.uk). 
 50. Id. (showing the U.S. EMTR (24%) to be less than Canada (25%), Germany (29%), and 
Japan (28%)); see also id. at 12 tbl.1.3 (listing G-7 countries as Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
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new equity investment was the same as the G-7 average (24%), whereas the 
U.S. average tax on debt-financed investments was lower than the G-7 average 
(negative 46% and 39% respectively).51  Table I also shows that in 2005, U.S. 
corporations—in comparison to all OECD countries—were taxed similarly, 
paying effectively 24% as compared with 20% for equity investments and 
negative 46% as compared with negative 32% for debt-financed investment.52  
Furthermore, in comparison with other OECD countries, the United States 
provides a relatively generous structure for certain tax incentives, particularly 
accelerated depreciation, as evidenced by row one of Table I.53  The conclusion 
from all of this data is that U.S. corporations do not face a substantially 
different tax burden than other nations’ corporations even though U.S. 
corporations face one of the highest statutory rates. 
The third important factor—the drain on the corporate income tax resulting 
from the tax rules that apply to corporations internationally—is substantial.  
Nations today face grave challenges to their tax systems as the result of other 
nations using their tax systems to compete for business activity.54  For over a 
century, the United States has vigorously pursued the taxation of residents’ 
economic activity outside the United States and the domestic activity of 
foreign persons.55  However, these rules do not yield significant revenue from 
foreign operations.56   
The fourth important factor is the reduction of the tax base by the deduction 
of imports.  Increased imports directly cause a reduction of the corporate tax 
base even where the production is by U.S.-owned foreign corporations.57  In 
                                                                                                                 
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States (citing Int’l Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
(2007a)). 
 51. Supra TABLE I. 
 52. Supra TABLE I. 
 53. Supra TABLE I; see also THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 9.  Tax 
incentives, particularly accelerated depreciation, first account for the drop from the U.S. statutory 
rate of 39% to the EMTR of 24% for equity capital, with an additional drop from 24% to negative 
46% EMTR for debt capital.  Supra TABLE I. 
 54. See Barker, supra note 17, at 171–80 (providing general treatment of international tax 
competition). 
 55. See id. at 182–84 (detailing the history of the United States’ comprehensive taxation, 
both foreign and domestic). 
 56. See infra Part I.B.  The present U.S. tax system, which includes residence taxation with 
deferral for foreign incorporated entities and foreign tax credits for U.S. corporations, produces 
little revenue.  See Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Where Will They Go if We Go 
Territorial?  Dividend Exemption and the Location Decisions of U.S. Multinational 
Corporations, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 787, 798 (2001) (finding that tax on repatriated earnings of 
multinational corporations can be approximately 3%). 
 57. See Alan J. Auerbach et al., Taxing Corporate Income, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN 
837, 853–55 (Stuart Adams et al. eds., 2010) (discussing the impact of taxation on multinational 
corporate decisions). 
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2007, net imports (the excess of imports over exports) represented 5% of U.S. 
GDP.58 
Although base broadening and a lower statutory rate should make the 
corporate tax system simpler and reduce compliance costs, these reforms do 
not address four of the most fundamental problems of the corporate tax system.  
Two of these features, the disparity in treatment of debt and equity and the 
problems of international taxation and tax competition, warrant further 
consideration.59 
A.  Debt v. Equity in the Corporate Setting 
The growth of new types of financial products has made it difficult for tax 
authorities to distinguish between debt and equity.60  Financial derivatives and 
other hybrid instruments have narrowed the distinction to such an extent that 
the distinction is meaningless in many cases.61  Yet, the disparate treatment of 
debt and equity remains one of the most important features of corporate 
taxation.62   
The United States applies a system of economic double taxation on 
corporate profits attributable to equity capital.63  In general, the return on 
equity investments is taxed both at the corporate level and at the shareholder 
level as dividends or capital gains.64 
Despite the two-level tax structure, the U.S. system does have some complex 
trade-offs.  Prior to the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2003,65 corporate dividends were simply taxed as ordinary income at regular 
                                                 
 58. See Alan J. Auerbach, A Modern Corporation Tax, THE HAMILTON PROJECT Dec. 2010, 
at 13, available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/12/corporate% 
20tax%20auerbach/12_corporate_tax_auerbach.pdf. 
 59. The remaining two features—the problematic use of pass-through entities and the 
impact of imports—are examined further in the discussion of cash flow taxes.  See infra Part II.B.  
In particular, the use of pass-through entities for large businesses could be addressed by 
reforming income taxation or cash flow taxation.  Both systems could address this problem by 
applying corporate tax to large non-corporate business.  In addition, a destination-based cash flow 
tax directly addresses the problem of imports.  See infra Part II. 
 60. See BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, 1 FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, ch. 4 (7th ed. 2006) (discussing the issue of debt versus 
equity, including classification issues as well as the use of hybrid debt and hybrid-equity vehicles, 
which further challenge classification schemes); Robert E. Culbertson & Jamie E. King, U.S. 
Rules on Earnings Stripping: Background Structure and Treaty Interaction, 29 TAX NOTES INT’L 
1161, 1161 (2003). 
 61. See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, at 859. 
 62. See id. at 857–58. 
 63. See THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 43. 
 64. Id. at 51.  To the extent that profits are not distributed to shareholders, these after-tax 
profits may be taxed to shareholders upon sales of shares to the extent these profits are reflected 
in the sale price of the shares.  Id. 
 65. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 
Stat. 752 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
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rates.66  Today, qualified corporate dividends are taxed at the taxpayer’s top 
marginal rate or 15%—whichever is lower.67  Double taxation is also mitigated 
somewhat by the treatment of retained earnings, which are only subject to the 
corporate tax and not the individual income tax.68  To the extent that a 
shareholder indirectly realizes these profits through a sale of shares, they 
would be subject to an individual income tax at the maximum rate for capital 
gains of 15%.69  This indirect second tax on retained corporate earnings is 
deferred until the shareholder disposes of his or her investment.70  The effect of 
deferral results in a substantial reduction of taxpayers’ income from capital 
invested in shares.71  One study estimated that the effective rate on capital 
gains from shares was between one-quarter and one-third of the statutory rate 
due to deferral.72  It has also been estimated that approximately one-half of 
corporate capital gains escape taxation altogether when held by taxpayers at 
death.73 
The tax treatment of corporate debt is quite different from equity.  Interest 
accrued on corporate debt is deductible from corporate profits.74  As shown in 
Table I, the treatment of debt financing results in a U.S. EMTR of negative 
46% for debt-financed capital used in corporate activity,75 while the U.S. 
EMTR for equity financing is positive 24%.76  The result is that the 
combination of tax incentives and debt financing produces a substantial 
                                                 
 66. See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, at 857. 
 67. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1), (h)(11) (2006) (treating qualified corporate dividends as capital gains 
with a 15% maximum tax rate).  The 15% maximum rate mitigates the effect of double taxation 
for those in the higher income tax brackets that exceed 15%.  See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, 
at 13. 
 68. See THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 221 (Mervyn A. King & Don Fullerton 
eds., 1984) (noting that retaining earnings creates a deferral advantage on later potential personal 
income tax). 
 69. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1) (providing a 15% maximum rate for long-term capital gains from the 
sale of corporate securities). 
 70. See Jane G. Gravelle, The Corporate Income Tax: Economic Issues and Policy Options, 
48 NAT’L TAX J. 267, 270–71 (1995). 
 71. See THE 2007 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 7, at 51. 
 72. See THE CAPITAL GAINS CONTROVERSY: A TAX ANALYSTS READER 1 (J. Andrew 
Hoerner ed., rev. ed. 1992). 
 73. See THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL, supra note 68, at 221 (“[N]o capital 
gains taxes are paid out of the estate, but the basis for calculating capital gains of the new owner 
is set equal to market value at the time of inheritance.”).  The transfer of property at death is not a 
taxable event.  See I.R.C. § 1001.  Those who receive property through inheritance are entitled to 
a fair market value basis in the property.  Id. § 1014. 
 74. See I.R.C. § 163.  Therefore, to the extent of interest payments, the profit earned through 
the use of debt is not subject to corporate tax.  See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, at 4.  Interest 
payments are included in the income of creditors and taxed at the creditor’s applicable rates. 
 75. See supra TABLE I. 
 76. See supra TABLE I. 
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government subsidy to corporations.77  In contrast, the return on new equity 
capital is subject to corporate level tax and results in a positive rate of tax.78 
In an ideal corporate income tax system, the rate of tax on the return to  
debt-financed investment should be zero.79  Currently, the negative rate of tax 
is created largely by the special tax preferences in the corporate system that 
cause the real system to deviate substantially from that ideal.80  Because both 
forms of capital currently enjoy these preferences, the gap between debt and 
equity would remain unchanged if preferences were eliminated.81  For 
example, reducing the maximum tax rate from 35% to 31% would lessen the 
corporate tax incidence on equity and would slightly reduce the tax benefit of 
debt financing.82  However, closer is not the same; the difference in treatment 
should be exactly the bite of the actual corporate tax rate. 
One proposal made by President Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory 
Board was to limit the deductibility of net interest.83  For example, one plan 
could be to limit the deductibility of interest expense to 90% for payments of 
more than $5 million per year.84  The estimate is that this plan would allow the 
corporate tax rate to be lowered by roughly .7%.85  Although such a provision 
might have some effect on the amount of corporate debt, it does very little to 
change the fundamental difference between debt and equity.86 
B.  International Taxation and the Corporate Income Tax Base 
Effective international taxation begins with the determination of the tax 
base—or what and who to tax.87  The concerns are the fair and efficient 
taxation of both resident taxpayers with foreign income generated by 
transactions and operations abroad, and foreign persons with domestic income 
                                                 
 77. See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
 78. See supra TABLE I. 
 79. See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, at 3 (proposing a tax system whereby the treatment 
of debt would mirror the treatment of equity—“taxable when borrowed but deductible when 
repaid”). 
 80. See 2012 JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 5–6. 
 81. An important tax advantage of deducting the return on debt-financed investment is that 
the interest deducted by corporations is nominal interest, which includes an inflationary 
component.  To cure this defect, the tax system should index the interest deduction for inflation.  
See James Mackie, Unfinished Business of the 1986 Tax Reform Act: An Effective Tax Rate 
Analysis Of Current Issues In The Taxation Of Capital Income, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 293, 294 (2002).  
Though the income tax over-taxes interest income because it includes the inflationary component, 
it under-taxes income financed by debt.  See infra Part III (providing a further discussion of 
interest). 
 82. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 83. 2012 JOINT REPORT, supra note 23, at 9–10. 
 84. Id. at 73. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. at 74. 
 87. See Barker, supra note 14, at 651. 
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generating transactions and operations in the United States.88  Although these 
objects appear to justify two different, but analogous tax bases—(1) the U.S. 
domestic source tax base for foreign corporations and (2) the foreign source 
tax base for U.S. resident corporations89—there are two other critical base 
considerations.  These bases are the net income earned by U.S.-owned foreign 
corporations, which are tax-exempt, and the domestic source base for U.S. 
corporations.90 
Generally, there are two primary international taxation regimes: territorial 
taxation and residence taxation.91  For U.S. corporations, the United States has 
adopted a residence taxation regime, which taxes the worldwide income 
generated by domestic and foreign operations transactions.92  However, this 
regime is elective in many instances due to the ability of U.S. corporations to 
conduct foreign activities through foreign-incorporated subsidiaries.93  For 
foreign corporations, the United States has adopted a territorial taxation regime 
that only taxes income generated in connection with the United States.94  
Although worldwide taxation and territorial taxation are conceptually quite 
distinct, both systems share many problems that are inherent with a global tax 
regime.95  Therefore, effective international taxation must begin with 
establishing and isolating these tax bases. 
The concept of territory is critical to all of these tax bases.  National borders, 
however, lose their traditional economic meaning when viewed from the 
perspective of multinational enterprises and their global activities.96  
International tax reform’s “primary focus should be protecting the domestic tax 
base [of both resident and non-resident corporations] from erosion that is 
caused by mischaracterizing and misvaluing foreign and domestic income.”97  
International income tax laws have proved largely ineffective at preventing this 
erosion.  Actual international tax reform has lacked both theoretical and 
political consensus on what should be done.98 
                                                 
 88. Id. at 652. 
 89. Id. at 651–52. 
 90. See id. 
 91. Id. at 650.  Territorial, or source taxation, “is based on the proposition that a country has 
the right to tax income that has ‘arisen’ in that country.”  Id.  Residence, or domiciliary taxation, 
“is a personal jurisdiction approach; a nation seeks to tax its residents on income irrespective of 
source.”  Id. 
 92. Id. at 650–51. 
 93. Id. at 651 (noting that, “[i]n general, income earned by U.S. owned foreign corporations 
is deferred until repatriation”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 650–52. 
 96. Id. at 650. 
 97. Id. at 651–52. 
 98. For example, in April 2010, Northwestern Law School held a symposium that brought 
together government officials from both Democratic and Republican administrations, academics, 
business representatives, and tax practitioners to address the problems and needs of international 
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Although territorial taxation of foreign-owned corporations in the United 
States does not typically receive the political and scholarly attention that 
worldwide taxation does, its importance should not be underestimated.99  In 
regard to all corporations doing business in the United States, foreign-owned 
corporations account for about 10% of the U.S. economy.100  Without U.S. 
taxation of foreign enterprises doing business in the United States comparable 
to U.S. taxation of domestic corporations, U.S. corporations could experience a 
substantial competitive tax disadvantage.101   
To see this, examine the three basic components of U.S. territorial taxation 
of foreign-owned corporations.  The first, the source of income within a 
territory, is a process of linking the production of income to a taxing 
jurisdiction.102 The second is the threshold for taxation of corporate business.  
In general, business income under the Internal Revenue Code is not taxed 
unless it is effectively connected with a trade or business within the United 
States103 or, as modified by treaty, is not taxed unless it is connected with a 
permanent establishment located within the United States.104  The third 
component is the type of tax.  Territorial tax is a tax on net income applied in 
the same fashion as applied to domestic taxpayers.105  Where U.S.-sourced 
income is not subject to business tax rules, it can be taxed on a gross basis.106 
Theoretically, worldwide taxation of U.S. corporations is not concerned with 
these limitations.  U.S. corporations are taxed on their worldwide income no 
matter where it is sourced.107  However, the scope of worldwide corporate 
taxation is dramatically affected by two major factors.  The first is that the 
                                                                                                                 
tax reform.  Hilary Hurd Anyaso, Northwestern Law Hosts International Tax Reform Symposium, 
NORTHWESTERN UNIV. (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories 
/2010/04/taxadvisory.html.  Though many different approaches were examined, agreement on 
reform of the international tax income system lacks any hope of consensus.  The reason is simple; 
no plan yet advanced does much to improve the situation.  See David L. Cameron and Philip F. 
Postlewaite, Symposium on International Tax Reform in a Reset Economy: Introduction, 30 NW. 
J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 505, 514 (2010). 
 99. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION 
ch.6, at 266 (2003) (devoting only one chapter to inbound business transactions). 
 100. See Cletus C. Coughlin, Foreign Owned Companies in the United States: Malign or 
Benign? 74 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 17, 19 (1992), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/92/05/Foreign_May_Jun1992.pdf. 
 101. Id. at 24–25. 
 102. See I.R.C. § 861 (2006) (providing the source rules relating to foreign income from 
sources within the United States). 
 103. Id. § 882.  Foreign corporations are taxed on income “effectively connected with a trade 
or business within the United States.”  Id. § 882(a)(1). 
 104. See United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, art. 5, 7(1) 
(raising the threshold for business taxation to income derived from a permanent establishment 
located within the United States). 
 105. I.R.C. § 882(a)(1). 
 106. Id. § 881(a). 
 107. See Barker, supra note 14, at 650. 
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taxing jurisdiction must give relief to the U.S. taxpayer for foreign tax paid.108  
The U.S. does this by allowing a tax credit against U.S. corporate taxes for 
foreign income taxes.109  The amount of this credit is limited by the U.S. tax 
that is paid on foreign income.110  Hence, the location or territory where the 
income is earned or sourced is a critical factor in determining the tax actually 
paid to the U.S.111 
The second aspect of worldwide U.S. taxation of U.S. corporations is the 
definition of a U.S. corporation.  Only corporations incorporated in the United 
States are U.S. corporations.112  U.S.-owned foreign corporations are not taxed 
directly on their income; any tax is deferred until the profits are repatriated to 
the U.S. corporation.113  The U.S. corporation is entitled to an indirect credit 
for foreign dividends with regard to the foreign tax on the foreign earnings of 
the U.S.-owned affiliate.114  Thus, the combination of the direct taxation of 
worldwide income of U.S. corporations and deferred, indirect taxation of 
foreign corporate income creates a powerful incentive for new enterprises to 
incorporate their parent corporations outside the United States in low-taxed 
foreign jurisdictions. 
The present system of worldwide taxation—with deferral for active business 
income earned by foreign corporations coupled with the application of the 
foreign tax credit for repatriated earnings—requires the proper determination 
of the source of income and the proper allocation of deductions between 
domestic and foreign sources.115  Territorial taxation of foreign enterprises by 
the United States must also confront the similar challenge of locating the site 
of income and deductions for allocation to the U.S. tax base.116  The lack of an 
economic basis or any consensus on appropriate rules of sourcing and 
allocation is well known117 and results in distortions in income and expense 
classification, which are magnified by the shifting of income and deductions 
through pricing and debt planning.118  Consequently, legislators have been 
                                                 
 108. I.R.C. § 901(a). 
 109. Id. § 904 (foreign tax credit limitation). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Barker, supra note 14, at 650–51. 
 112. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3)–(5) (defining a domestic and foreign corporation). 
 113. See Barker, supra note 14, at 651 & n.23. 
 114. I.R.C. § 902. 
 115. See supra text accompanying notes 108–14. 
 116. See supra text accompanying notes 102–06. 
 117. See, e.g., Barker, supra note 17, at 202–12 (analyzing a variety of international source 
rules and their respective flaws); Fred B. Brown, An Equity-Based, Multilateral Approach for 
Sourcing Income Among Nations, 11 FLA. TAX. REV. 565, 629 (2011) (stressing the necessity for 
international agreement); Stephen E. Shay et al., The David R. Tillinghast Lecture “What’s 
Source Got to Do With It?”  Source Rules and U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 
137–38 (2002) (examining the inherent difficulties of allocating individual gains based on the 
underlying net income concept of U.S. federal income tax laws). 
 118. See Barker, supra note 14, at 674; see also supra Part I.A. 
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active in enacting complex anti-avoidance rules to mitigate the abuses.119  
However, as shown in Table I, the combination of debt financing and tax 
incentives results in a negative corporate income tax on the debt-financed 
activities of U.S. corporations.120 
Due to the prevalence of debt financing of foreign-owned corporations doing 
business in the United States, the U.S. corporate income tax is quite 
ineffectual.121  As demonstrated in Part I.A, corporations can easily replace 
equity capital with debt capital, thereby removing would-be profits from the 
tax base.122  The problem of debt financing is further exacerbated in the case 
where the creditor of the foreign-owned U.S. enterprise is a related party, 
which may result in excessive deductible interest payments.123  This  
practice—the overuse of debt and charging interest that represent a rate greater 
than a market return on debt capital—is called “earnings stripping.”124  In the 
United States, which provides for transfer pricing rules and regulations on debt 
characterization, Congress has tried to curb the abuse through legislation.125  
Generally, however, only a fundamental change in the way the United States 
taxes foreign-owned enterprises would cure this problem.126 
Although the United States has taken aggressive measures toward foreign 
operations of U.S. corporations, it hardly seems worth the effort.  The United 
States collects little revenue from the foreign business of U.S. corporations.127  
The nation stands alone today as the only country in the world that attempts to 
tax the worldwide business income of its resident corporations.128  Among the 
proposals for international tax reform,129 many governments have moved to 
                                                 
 119. I.R.C. § 482 (2006) (permitting the adjustment of income calculations to prevent tax 
evasion); id. § 951(a) (taxing U.S. shareholders on certain income from their controlled foreign 
corporations in order to prevent erosion of the U.S. tax base); Barker, supra note 14, at 674 
(noting the substantial compliance cost of anti-avoidance rules). 
 120. Supra TABLE I (U.S. corporations pay negative 46% on debt-financed investment). 
 121. See Culbertson & King, supra note 60, at 1161–62. 
 122. See id. at 1161–66; see also supra Part I.A. 
 123. See Culbertson & King, supra note 60, at 1162; see also supra note 46 and 
accompanying text (explaining that interest on corporate debt is deductible). 
 124. See Culbertson & King, supra note 60, at 1161–66 (describing the practice known as 
earnings stripping in detail). 
 125. I.R.C. § 163(j) (2006) (limiting interest deductions if a corporation has excess interest 
and a debt-to-equity ratio that exceeds 1.5 to 1); id. § 267(b) (defining related entities for 
purposes of § 163(j)); see also Culbertson & King, supra note 60, at 1166–69 (describing the 
interplay between these and other relevant statutes). 
 126. See generally William B. Barker, An International Tax System for Emerging Economies, 
Tax Sparing and Development: It Is All About Source!, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L. L. 349 (2007) 
(providing such a proposal). 
 127. See supra note 56. 
 128. See Barker, supra note 14, at 647, 650–51, 682 (explaining that the United States is 
unique in its approach to taxing a corporation based on its worldwide income). 
 129. See id. at 647–87 (discussing the various reform proposals and their drawbacks). 
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comprehensive corporate income taxation with the exemption of active foreign 
business income.130 
To date, lawmakers in the United States do not appear interested in such a 
change, nor should it be recommended.  Studies have shown that this “new” 
regime of territorial income taxation, known as exemption systems, is subject 
to the same compliance costs, difficulties, and abuses as the present U.S. 
system.131  Exemption of foreign business income also raises the same 
sourcing, allocation, and characterization problems that deferral does.132 
II.  THE ELEMENTS OF A CASH FLOW TAX ON CORPORATIONS 
The suggestion of a cash flow tax as the solution to tax reform is not 
novel.133  Previous proposals have primarily focused, however, on the desire to 
replace the income tax with a consumption tax for all taxpayers.134  This 
article’s contribution is quite different; it suggests only a reform of the 
corporate income tax, which is accomplished by implementing a cash flow tax 
solely for corporations and other large businesses.135  It also rejects the 
longstanding view that countries should adopt an origin-based cash flow tax136 
and instead proposes a destination-based cash flow tax.  This dramatically 
different conclusion results from approaching the problems of effective 
taxation of corporate income from an international perspective.  It unifies 
corporate tax under one principle: all corporations, whether foreign or 
domestic, without thresholds or exceptions, are subject to a  
destination-based cash flow tax.137 
                                                 
 130. Id. at 682. 
 131. Id. at 682–86. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text. 
 134. See supra notes 4–8 and accompanying text. 
 135. This proposal was first illuminated in a prior work by this author and was meant to 
respond to an article by Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah in which Prof. Avi-Yonah suggested the 
merits of a territorial cash flow tax on corporations.  See William B. Barker, Tax Reform in the 
(Inter)National Interest: Why Wait?, 124 TAX NOTES 828, 828 (2009).  In April 2010, this same 
author delivered a paper on this same topic at Northwestern University School of Law’s 
Symposium on International Tax Reform in a Reset Economy, which was published in the 2010 
summer issue of the Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business.  See Barker, supra 
note 14.  In that paper, the author further refined his recommendations by proposing the adoption 
of a destination-based, territorial consumption tax for all corporations.  Id. at 687–97.  In 
December 2010, Professor Alan J. Auerbach, in a paper released jointly by the Center for 
American Progress and The Hamilton Project, also proposed the adoption of a destination-based 
cash flow tax for corporations.  See Auerbach, supra note 58, at 10. 
 136. This was the proposal of both THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 229–30, and HALL 
& RABUSHKA, supra note 5, at 60–61. 
 137. Unlike many of the previous works on comprehensive consumption taxes, the proposal 
that the United States should adopt a destination-based cash flow tax for all corporations is the 
outgrowth of considerations of international taxation reform.  Early research demonstrated that 
the principle problem with international taxation was its lack of an economic basis for the source 
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A.  The Basics of Cash Flow Taxes 
Taxation under a cash flow tax does exactly what its name suggests; it taxes 
the net positive cash flow of a business.138  The basic form includes the value 
of all receipts in income and allows a deduction for all payments.139  The 
essential difference between a cash flow tax and an income tax is the treatment 
of capital expenditures.140  Whereas a cash flow tax provides for the immediate 
deduction of all capital expenditures, an ideal income tax denies the immediate 
deduction of capital expenditures, requiring instead that the taxpayer deduct 
those expenditures over the useful life of the asset through depreciation.141  
However, the practical consequences are more complex.   
The general rule under the American income tax system is that expenditures 
for tangible assets with a useful life of more than one year are capitalized.142  It 
                                                                                                                 
rules for foreign and domestic income.  The application of cash flow tax concepts results in a 
practical, fair, and economically sound allocation of income and expenses between resident 
countries taxing on a worldwide basis and host countries taxing on a territorial basis.  The basic 
premise is that a cash flow tax captures the value that is attributable to the location in which the 
business is conducted.  It provides a fair allocation of non-capital business income among nations, 
while capital income is fairly allocated exclusively to the nation where that capital was produced 
or derived, which is the state of the taxpayer’s residence.  See Barker, supra note 126, at 374–75 
(advocating that the revenue produced by multinational corporations should be taxed by the 
countries in which they operate). 
These insights led to the conclusion that an effective and fair base for source taxation of business 
profits is domestic economic rents.  This left the tax on the normal return from capital from 
foreign activities to the nation of the taxpayer’s residence.  The most practical method to 
implement such a system was to use a cash flow expenditure tax.   See id. at 380 (arguing for rent 
taxation systems in developing nations). 
Later research expanded upon this analysis and concluded that a cash flow tax system should be 
applied to all corporations in the United States, both foreign and domestic.  This recommendation 
proceeded from two interdependent factors. 
The first was the understanding that resident states face many of the same practical problems of 
effective corporate taxation that source states do.  See Barker, supra note 14, at 682–86.  Second, 
the free movement of many of the factors of production, specifically capital and technology, has 
led to increasing tax competition.  See Barker, supra note 17, at 721–22.  Even developed 
nations’ resident tax systems are strained by transfer pricing issues, debt equity issues, and 
foreign income deferral.  Both the economic and the tax bases of many nations are at risk.  This 
leads to the practical solution to abandon the corporate tax on capital income, while leaving intact 
taxation of an individual’s capital income and progressive income tax principles.  In general, a tax 
on business income without a tax on capital income can be implemented best by a cash flow tax.  
See Barker, supra note 126, at 381–82. 
 138. See BASIC TAX REFORM, supra note 2, at 2, 9. 
 139. See How Much Capital Taxed, supra note 4, at 1.  A cash flow tax would continue the 
income tax rule that individual gifts are not deductible.  See I.R.C. § 274(b) (2006).  There is no 
technical reason for why the deduction for charitable contributions could not be continued.  See 
id. § 170. 
 140. See How Much Capital Taxed, supra note 4, at 1. 
 141. Id.; see also BASIC TAX REFORM, supra note 2, at 44 (discussing the inherent 
difficulties in determining the depreciation of an asset in an income tax system). 
 142. I.R.C. § 263A(a). 
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is this cost or basis that is recovered, ideally, through depreciation over the 
economic useful life of an asset.143  The U.S. tax system provides several 
mechanisms to accelerate these deductions, permitting the taxpayer to recover 
costs more quickly.144  Similarly, in the case of intangible assets, the basic 
structure of capitalization and depreciation is applied by statute and 
regulation.145  American tax law, however, is riddled with exceptions.146  Many 
intangibles, like going concern value or goodwill, are a byproduct of otherwise 
deductible expenditures like wages, and therefore are not capitalized and 
depreciated.147  The statutory scheme of capitalization and amortization is 
primarily a factor only when intangibles are acquired through direct 
purchase.148  Finally, the cost of some assets, like land, cannot be depreciated 
either because they are not consumed in creating income or because they lack a 
fixed, determinable useful life required for depreciation under an income tax 
system.149  Their costs can only be recovered upon sale or other disposition of 
the asset.150 
Most studies performed by economists compare an ideal income tax that 
permits only economic depreciation with a consumption tax that permits the 
deduction of all profit-making expenditures, including wages.151  The present 
U.S. income tax system permits first-year deductions or credits for many 
expenditures that create value beyond the end of the taxable year, including 
advertising and research and development, and allows deductions or greatly 
accelerated depreciation for other capital expenditures—thus making the 
present system a hybrid income/consumption tax system.152  Therefore, 
comparing idealized forms overstates the advantage to taxpayers and the loss 
                                                 
 143. See BASIC TAX REFORM, supra note 2, at 44 (stating that, conversely, the tax base is 
eroded when depreciation rules are inconsistent with the actual depreciation of an asset). 
 144. I.R.C. § 168 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (permitting an accelerated cost recovery system). 
 145. See I.R.C. § 197 (allowing for straight line depreciation, or amortization, of intangible 
assets); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)–4(f) (2004) (providing the general rule for capitalization). 
 146. Research and development activities that can produce considerable future value are 
generally deductible by statute.  See I.R.C. § 174(a) (granting the taxpayer an election to deduct 
research and experimental expenditures).  Advertising, which creates value over more than one 
year, is deductible.  See Don Fullerton & Andrew B. Lyon, Tax Neutrality and Intangible Capital, 
in 2 TAX POLICY & THE ECONOMY 63, 66 (Lawrence H. Summers ed., 1988). 
 147. The test for capitalization is very broad.  Expenditures that create significant future 
benefits must be capitalized.  See Indopco, Inc. v. C.I.R., 503 U.S. 79, 88–89 (1992). 
 148. See I.R.C. § 197(d) (providing examples of intangible assets subject to amortization); 
see also Amy J. Bokinsky, Note, Section 197: Taxpayer Relief and Questions of Asymmetry, 14 
VA. TAX REV. 211, 236 (1994) (“To amortize an intangible asset, it must have been purchased in 
a taxable transaction.”). 
 149. I.R.C. § 167. 
 150. Id. § 1001. 
 151. See, e.g., BASIC TAX REFORM, supra note 2, at 44 (comparing depreciation in an income 
tax model with depreciation in a cash flow tax model). 
 152. Roger Gordon et al., Do We Now Collect Any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income?, 88 
J. PUB. ECON. 981, 1000–01 (2004). 
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of revenue to the government of consumption taxes.153  It should not be 
surprising that one recent study concluded that overall revenue would not 
significantly decrease were the corporate tax system changed from income to 
cash flow.154  Thus, our present hybrid income/consumption tax system 
attempts to reach certain consumption tax results without the practical benefit 
of a consistent consumption tax approach.155 
In comparison, a cash flow tax measures what is available for consumption 
after accounting for all expenditures.156  Consequently, all expenditures for 
assets that are normally capitalized under an income tax system are simply 
deducted.157  The treatment of financial assets under a cash flow tax depends 
on the type of cash flow system adopted.158 
The value of a cash flow tax to the taxpayer is that the immediate deduction 
of all expenditures does not tax the normal return on capital, whether in the 
form of debt or equity.159  However, a cash flow tax does tax the supernormal 
returns to capital, which are referred to as economic rents.160  A corporate 
income tax, in an asymmetrical fashion, taxes the normal return on equity, but 
does not tax the normal return on debt.161  It does this by allowing a deduction 
for interest but not for dividends.162 
If an individual earns all returns on debt or equity capital directly, there 
would be no distinction between debt and equity under a comprehensive 
income tax system.163  Basic investment of either debt or equity would be tax 
neutral, as would capital recovery of any sort.164  The return on capital, 
whether the profits on capital take the form of a return on equity or interest on 
debt, would be included.165 
                                                 
 153. See, e.g., Fullerton & Lyon, supra note 146, at 63–64 (finding that untaxed intangible 
capital reduces overall efficiency in the current tax structure). 
 154. See Gordon et al., supra note 152, at 987–89. 
 155. Id. at 1000–01 (explaining that the U.S. system “has long been recognized as a hybrid of 
an income and consumption tax, with elements that do not fit naturally into either pure system”). 
 156. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. 
 157. See id.; see also supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text. 
 158. See infra Part II.C (discussing the differences between R and R&F-type cash flows). 
 159. See Barker, supra note 14, at 689; see also infra Part III. 
 160. See Noël B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base, 
52 TAX L. REV. 17, 23–24 (1996); David Elkins & Christopher Hanna, Taxation of Supernormal 
Returns, 62 TAX LAW. 93, 100 (2009). 
 161. See Barker, supra note 14, 689. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Cunningham, supra note 160, at 23–24; see also Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity 
Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1058–65 (2000) (describing the 
current U.S. debt-equity distinction in tax treatment). 
 164. See Pratt, supra note 163, at 1058–65. 
 165. Id. 
2012] Common Sense Corporate Tax: Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax 975 
The incidence of corporate tax, however, adds a new perspective on the tax 
treatment of different forms of investment capital.166  Debt is subject to one 
layer of tax, whereas equity is subject to two.167  Thus, in the context of 
individual taxpayers, the distinction between debt and equity is mostly about 
assigning priorities among the business owners and creditors.168  
Corporate form changes everything because the true owner of equity capital 
is not the corporation.  Where investment is made in corporate form, the 
incidence of a separate corporate tax within an income tax system treats such 
investment in dramatically different ways depending on its classification as 
debt or equity.169  Classic taxation imposes tax at the investor level equally on 
interest or dividends.170  Interest expense is deductible by the corporation; 
however, dividend payments are not deductible by the corporation.171  This 
results in one level of tax being imposed solely on the creditor for the return on 
debt capital.172  The return on equity capital is taxed twice.173   
The following table illustrates this distinction.  Compare an equal investment 
of debt and equity under both the classical system and the present modified 
system.174  Assume a 34% corporate tax rate, a 35% individual tax rate, and a 
special rate of 15% on corporate dividends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 166. See supra Part I.A (discussing debt and equity in the corporate setting). 
 167. See Pratt, supra note 163, at 1064; see also supra Part I.A. 
 168. See supra Part I.A.  Whether we consider the principle amount of a loan or the 
commitment of equity capital, the flow to and from a business is tax neutral.  As to the return on 
capital, interest is deductible by the business, thus ensuring that the portion of the profits paid as 
interest is taxed once to the owner of that stream of income. The return on equity capital is not 
deductible to ensure that the owner of that capital is assessed tax on the return from that capital. 
 169. See infra TABLE II. 
 170. Under present law, dividends are taxed at a maximum rate of 15%, which is the standard 
tax rate on long-term capital gains.  See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006); see also supra text accompanying 
note 69. 
 171. See Pratt, supra note 163, at 1058–65. 
 172. See infra TABLE II. 
 173. It is first taxed to the corporation, and—when profits are distributed out of the 
corporation’s after-tax income—the returns are taxed a second time to the shareholders. 
 174. See infra TABLE II. 
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TABLE II 
 Debt Equity (at 35%) Equity (Div 15%) 
Invest 1000 1000 1000 
Profit 100 100 100 
Corp. Tax 34% 0 34 34 
Distribution 100 66 66 
Tax at 35% 35 23.10  
Tax at 15%   9.9 
After Tax Return 65 42.90 56.1 
 
In order for the taxpayer to receive the same after-tax return on equity as on 
debt, the corporate profit on equity financing in the case of the present split 
rate (15%) system would have to be $115.86 instead of $100.00.175  In the 
classical system, with the full taxation of dividend income and the taxpayer 
being in the highest tax bracket (34%), the before-tax corporate income would 
have to be $129.97.176 
B.  Origin v. Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxes 
There are two different systems for defining the tax base of a cash flow tax: 
the destination principle and the origin principle.177  Both are territorial tax 
systems and, like all cash flow taxes, both do not tax the normal return from 
capital—they only tax the economic rents earned by a corporation.178 
Origin and destination-based cash flow taxes differ in how they determine 
inclusions and exclusions from the tax base.  The tax base under an origin 
principle identifies the value created by a nation after subtracting the normal 
cost of capital.179   The first component is the total income from the sale of 
goods and services sold in a country, whether produced domestically or 
imported.180  The second component is the deduction of the total cost 
associated with those goods and services, whether produced domestically or 
imported.181  The result is that an origin-based cash flow tax reaches only 
domestic production.182 
The tax base under a destination principle identifies the value consumed by a 
nation after excluding the normal cost of capital.183  The first component is the 
                                                 
 175. The formula is 65 = X - .34X - 15(X - .34X). 
 176. The formula is 65 = X - .34X - .35(X - .34X). 
 177. See Barker, supra note 14, at 690. 
 178. Id. at 690–96; see also infra Part III. 
 179. See Barker, supra note 90, at 690. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 692–93. 
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total income from the sale of all goods and services destined for the home 
market, which excludes all sales of exported goods and services.184  The 
second component is the deduction of the cost of all goods and services 
produced in the country, which does not allow for a deduction of imports.185   
The destination principle’s opposite treatment of exports and imports results in 
a tax on production consumed in the home market irrespective of where it was 
produced.186  Whereas the origin principle taxes domestic production, the 
destination principle taxes domestic consumption.187 
Thus, when seeking to establish a cash flow tax base, the choice is between a 
tax on domestic production or on domestic consumption.  The origin-based 
approach taxes on the basis of what a nation adds to the store of 
consumables.188  Its territorial form relinquishes the right to foreign-produced 
economic rents consumed within the United States, while gaining the right to 
U.S.-produced economic rents consumed outside the United States.189  
The destination-based approach taxes on the basis of what a nation removes 
from the store of consumables.190  In contrast to the origin principle, its 
territorial form relinquishes the right to domestic-produced economic rents 
consumed outside the United States while gaining the right to  
foreign-produced economic rents consumed inside the United States.191 
Both an origin-based and destination-based cash flow tax offer a nation a 
legitimate tax base well within the general sovereignty of each nation.  From a 
philosophical perspective, both systems reach consumption.  The only issue, 
however, is whose consumption is taxed: that of Americans only or that of all 
persons consuming American goods and services.192  Purely practical 
considerations dictate that in a globalized world where many of the factors of 
production are mobile and where, consequently, other nations will compete for 
business with tax incentives, only a destination-based cash flow tax will yield a 
largely unavoidable corporate tax.193   
                                                 
 184. Id. at 692–94. 
 185. Id. at 693. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 690–91; see also supra note 160 and accompanying text (describing economic 
rents). 
 190. Barker, supra note 14, at 692–93.  Taxation under the destination principle is more 
consistent with general consumption tax philosophy.  See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 158 
(George Rutledge & Sons, 3d ed. 1887) (setting forth the classical justification for consumption 
taxes: taxing on what one removes from society rather than taxing on what one produces or 
contributes to society).  Although this justification makes sense for individuals, it is not 
persuasive when applied to corporations as they do not directly consume. 
 191. See Barker, supra note 14, at 693. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. at 694–95. 
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Because an origin-based approach taxes exports and allows deductions for 
imports, it provides a tax incentive for locating production outside the home 
country and provides a strong incentive for transfer pricing abuse.194  Thus, an 
origin-based tax distorts economic decision-making in an open economy where 
many of the factors of production are mobile and corporations are free to locate 
their activities outside the United States.195  A destination principle eliminates 
exports and imports from the tax base, thus its subject matter—domestic sales 
and domestic production—is much more easily monitored by the taxing 
jurisdiction.196  Therefore, a destination-based cash flow tax does not distort 
economic decision-making and renders the tax largely unavoidable, even in the 
real world of open economies.197  Consequently, the destination principle 
eliminates much of the benefit of non-arm’s-length transfer pricing, which 
remains an important loophole in both income taxes and origin-based  
cash flow taxes.198  Although similar to a destination-based value added tax 
(VAT) imposed only on corporations, the destination-based cash flow tax 
diverges from the VAT in that it allows a deduction for wages paid for services 
performed in the United States.199  Thus, unlike a VAT, a destination-based 
cash flow tax is not a tax on labor; it is a tax on economic rents closely 
associated with a particular nation through its peoples’ consumption.200 
C.  Two Methods for Measuring Cash Flow: The R-Type and the R&F-Type 
Cash Flow Tax 
There are two general models that can be used for measuring cash flow.  
Each starts with a comprehensive income tax base and allows an immediate 
deduction for materials, labor, and fixed assets.201  The basic model, the  
R-type, ignores all financial transactions, with dividends and interest neither 
                                                 
 194. See id. at 691 (describing transfer pricing abuse when multinational businesses 
artificially inflate the cost of imports or deflate the cost of exports to respectively increase 
deductions or decrease taxable income). 
 195. See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, at 839, 883–84 (noting that an  
origin-based cash flow tax is nondistortionary only in a closed economy); see also Barker, supra 
note 126, at 351–52. 
 196. See Barker, supra note 14, at 695 (noting that “problems of avoidance under a 
destination expenditure tax are substantially eliminated,” while incentives to mischaracterize 
domestic sales as exports and imports as domestic production will remain). 
 197. See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, at 839, 883–84; see also Barker, supra note 14, at 
695. 
 198. See supra notes 121–26, 194–97. 
 199. See Auerbach et al, supra note 57, at 839, 883–84. 
 200. Id. at 884–85. 
 201. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 230–33; see also Barker, supra note 14, at 
689. 
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taxed when received nor deductible when paid.202  Both payments and 
repayments of equity capital and debt principal are tax-neutral.203 
A second design, the R&F-type, changes the treatment of all financial 
instruments.  On the one hand, all amounts received as interest, dividends, the 
principal amount of the debt, and the initial equity investment are included in 
the tax base.204  On the other hand, payments of interest, dividends, and the 
principal amount of debt and equity investments are deducted.205  The  
R&F-type takes into account all cash flows, both real and financial.206  The  
R-type takes into account only real cash flows from business operations.207 
Because the sole difference between the models is the treatment of financial 
transactions, the R-type is often recommended for active business enterprises 
on account of its perceived simplicity.208  The R-type is not recommended for 
financial service enterprises because its application would exempt most profit, 
as the R-type exempts net interest income.209  An R&F-type, however, includes 
all capital flows, which includes net interest.  Where a corporation’s primary 
business is providing credit and other financial services, the R-type method 
would fail to capture the true profit of the firm.210 
Financial service businesses are similar to other businesses because they also 
provide services and products.211  Their product, so to speak, is credit.  Their 
services include various items that facilitate the flow of money and capital. 
Much of a financial service business’s gross income is in the form of interest 
and not payments for specific services, even where a substantial portion of the 
charge is for services.212  Were banks to charge fairly and separately for all 
services, the exemption of interest income and interest expense under an  
R-type system would make less difference.  Interest paid to bank depositors 
                                                 
 202. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 230–33; see also Barker, supra note 14, at 
689. 
 203. See Barker, supra note 14, at 689. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 233. 
 207. See id. at 230. 
 208. See id. at 239.  Because neither profits nor losses are part of the system, a yield exempt 
or R system is thought to be the economic equivalent of an R&F or pure cash flow system 
because both exempt the normal return from capital but not the risk premium.  A yield exempt 
does differ from the pure cash flow in exempting economic rents whereas cash flow does not.  
See How Much Capital Taxed, supra note 4, at 14.  Because financial transactions under the  
R-type are ignored, no accounting for them need be made.  See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 
2, at 240.  In contrast, every part of financial transactions is included under an R&F system.  See 
Barker, supra note 14, at 689. 
 209. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 236, 240; see also Barker, supra note 14, at 
695. 
 210. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 236, 240; see also Barker, supra note 14, at 
695. 
 211. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 236. 
 212. See id. 
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would be higher where all services provided to depositors were separately 
charged, and interest charged to borrowers would be lower because some of 
the value provided to borrowers would be re-characterized as service 
income.213  As a result, financial service providers would start to resemble 
business enterprises that tend to be net debtors with financial costs exceeding 
financial gains.214  As long as this is the case, an R-type system captures the 
true profits or economic rents of the corporate enterprise.215  However, where 
any corporation earns net financial profits, the only way to capture these true 
profits or economic rents is by including interest and all other capital flows in 
the tax base under an R&F-type cash flow tax.216 
Application of the R&F-type method to corporations should not be lightly 
abandoned because of its perceived complexity.  Applied to relatively 
sophisticated corporations, the R&F-type is straightforward; some suggest the 
R&F-type system is only slightly more technically difficult than an R-type and 
is conceptually simpler because it treats all receipts and expenditures the 
same.217  There would be no reason to characterize different receipts or 
expenditures as real or financial because they would all be fully included in the 
tax base.218  Corporations are sufficiently sophisticated to apply the R&F-type, 
which merely requires accounting for all capital flows.219  Indeed, taxation 
should be much simpler when compared to the current corporate income tax. 
The perception that the R&F-type is more complex can be the result of 
viewing it from the income tax perspective.  An R&F-type radically changes 
the way capital is treated in that the principal amount of loans and equity 
capital are added to income when received.220  Similarly, deducting the 
repayment of loans, equity capital, dividends, and interest is equally strange 
from an income tax perspective.221  The R-type, however, also contains 
elements foreign to an income tax, such as the exclusion of interest and 
dividends from income and the inability to deduct interest.222  This has led to 
the suggestion that an R&F-type should be adopted for non-financial 
                                                 
 213. See Bank of Am. v. United States, 680 F.2d 142, 143–45 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (providing an 
example of the difficulty in distinguishing between interest and other financial service income in 
the international context); see also THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 231–32. 
 214. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 230–32.  It is more likely in the case of  
non-financial business enterprises that the returns from financial capital would take the form of 
business profits, which are fully included in income in an R-type tax.  See id. at 230. 
 215. See id. 
 216. See Barker, supra note 14, at 689. 
 217. See id.; see also supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 218. See Barker, supra note 14, at 689.  A cash flow tax would undoubtedly continue the 
income tax’s prohibition of deducting gifts over $25.  See I.R.C. § 274(b) (2006).  However, it 
may also continue the deductibility of charitable contributions.  Id. § 170. 
 219. See Barker, supra note 14, at 689. 
 220. Compare Barker, supra note 14, at 689, with Pratt, supra note 163, at 1054–64. 
 221. See Barker, supra note 14, at 689. 
 222. See id. 
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enterprises only for debt,223 solely on the basis that it would aid the transition 
from an income tax that allows the deduction of interest to an R-type that does 
not.224 
The adoption of such a hybrid R/R&F-type would be a mistake.  The hybrid 
R/R&F-type perpetuates the distinctions between debt and equity, whereas the 
R-type ignores them and the R&F-type eliminates them.225  Only applying cash 
flow principles to debt but not to equity capital would make the system 
dependent on the problems of debt-equity characterization that plague the 
income tax.226  The history of the income tax demonstrates the ambiguity 
inherent in such classifications; courts and administrators have always 
struggled with classification regimes and their application.227  Because debt 
and equity are both forms of capital investment, the exaggerated difference in 
tax regimes provides large incentives for manipulation.228  A hybrid  
R/R&F-type would put a premium on careful planning to take advantage of 
cash flow principles for debt and exemption principles for equity.229   
The adoption of the basic R-type would similarly be a mistake, as it also 
creates opportunities for tax avoidance.  The R-type creates critical distinctions 
in classifications by excluding financial transactions from cash flow.230  These 
distinctions are not between debt and equity but between operating income and 
expense, and financial income and expense.231  The R-type advantages 
financial income, which is exempt, and operating expenses, which are 
deductible.232  This allows the opportunity to take advantage of these 
asymmetries when tax planning.233  
Thus, a hybrid R/R&F-type perpetuates the income distinctions between 
debt and equity234 and the R-type creates a new distinction between financial 
and non-financial transactions.235  Both types would perpetuate important 
                                                 
 223. See Altshuler & Grubert, supra note 56, at 795. 
 224. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 233; see also Altshuler & Grubert, supra note 
56, at 795. 
 225. See Barker, supra note 14, at 689. 
 226. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 60, ch. 4 (providing detail on these existing 
problems); see generally Pratt, supra note 163. 
 227. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 60, ch. 1.01; see also Pratt, supra note 163, at 
1065–72 (detailing the history of corporate income tax and the debt-equity distinction). 
 228. See Culbertson & King, supra note 60, at 1161–62. 
 229. See supra Part I.A.  For example, where interest expenditures exceed interest income, 
the ideal plan would be the utilization of debt, which would yield a net deduction.  Where interest 
income exceeds interest expense, the ideal form would be equity since the net equity income 
would be exempt. 
 230. See David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L. REV. 599, 624 (2000). 
 231. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 230–32. 
 232. See id. 
 233. See id. 
 234. See supra notes 220–29 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 230–33 and accompanying text. 
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defects in the present corporate income tax system.  These problems evaporate 
with the R&F-type cash flow tax, which does not differentiate between debt 
and equity nor between financial and non-financial transactions.236  
Consequently, characterization of receipts or expenditures is irrelevant, 
removing the central element of most tax arbitrage schemes.  The adoption of 
the R&F-type furthers the objective of creating a largely unavoidable corporate 
tax.237 
Applying this concept internationally, U.S. corporations could continue to 
conduct their foreign operations under separate corporations.238  Conversely, 
foreign-owned corporations could continue to conduct their U.S. activities in 
separate corporations subject to a destination-based cash flow tax.239  Incoming 
loans, capital from shareholders, dividends, and interest would be included in 
the tax base whether the source was domestic or foreign.240  Similarly, 
outgoing loans, equity payments to shareholders, dividends, and interest would 
be deducted from the tax base whether the source was domestic or foreign.241 
Further, foreign borrowing should not be excluded from the tax base despite 
suggestions to the contrary.242  First, the system would be simpler if no 
distinction were made between U.S. and foreign loans.  If a corporation desired 
to keep its foreign financial activities separate, it could place these activities in 
a foreign corporation.243  Second, for U.S. operations, the change with foreign 
borrowing does little substantively because full inclusion or full exclusion are 
essentially economic equivalents for loans.244  But were the tax law to 
distinguish between both the source and the destination of funds as relevant to 
inclusion or exclusion, complex tracing and accounting would be required.245  
Finally, fully including loans regardless of their source or destination does not 
result in any benefit to the taxpayer because the loans would be fully subject to 
the cash flow principle.246  As demonstrated in the tables below, only the 
                                                 
 236. See THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 233; see also Barker, supra note 14, at 689. 
 237. See supra Part I.A (discussing avoidance measures under the current corporate tax 
regime). 
 238. See Barker, supra note 14, at 692–95 (discussing the merits of a destination-based  
R&F-type tax). 
 239. See id. 
 240. See id. 
 241. See id. 
 242. See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, at 887–88 (suggesting that foreign borrowing under 
a destination-based R&F-type tax would not generate taxable income). 
 243. See Barker, supra note 14, at 693 (“The destination principle exempts the economic 
rents that are consumed elsewhere.”). 
 244. This holds true where the interest rate is a market rate because, by definition, a market 
rate represents the normal return on capital, which is tax-exempt under a yield exempt tax and a 
cash flow tax.  See discussion infra Part III. 
 245. The loan would be taxed when received and deducted when paid.  See Barker, supra 
note 14, at 689; see also infra TABLE III. 
 246. See infra TABLE III. 
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destination of the expenditures is relevant to a destination-based cash flow tax 
because intragroup cash flows are ignored and only domestic expenditures are 
deducted. 
 
TABLE III 
Inclusion of Foreign Financial Transactions 
Source of Loan Destination of Proceeds 
 
U.S. Lender: 
Receipt principal and interest included 
Repayment with interest deducted 
 
Same as 
 
Foreign Lender: 
Receipt included 
Repayment with interest deducted 
 
U.S. Production: 
Expenditures deducted 
Disposition of asset included 
 
Or 
 
Foreign Production: 
Expenditure not deducted 
Disposition not included 
 
 
Exclusion of Foreign Loans 
Source Destination 
 
U.S. Loans: 
Receipt principal and interest included 
Repayment with interest deducted 
 
Different from 
 
Foreign Loans: 
Exclude receipts 
No deduction for payments 
 
U.S. Production: 
Receipt principal and interest included 
Repayment with interest deducted 
 
Different from 
 
Foreign Production: 
Exclude receipts 
No deduction for payments 
D.  A Comparison of Income and Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxes 
The United States should replace the corporate income tax with an  
R&F-type, destination-based cash flow tax.  To illustrate the effects of this 
proposal, the following tables illustrate the results of comparing an income tax 
system and a destination-based cash flow corporate tax system.  First, Table IV 
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considers a U.S. or foreign corporation that imports goods and services for sale 
in the United States.  It is assumed that the foreign corporation meets the 
threshold for U.S. taxation by meeting either the statutory test or the treaty 
test.247   
 
TABLE IV248 
Comparison of Present U.S. Corporate Income Tax with R-Type  
Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax 
Inflow (Income) Amount Income Tax Cash Flow 
Gross income from sales, rents, 
royalties, sales of business 
assets (U.S. source) 10,000 10,000 10,000 
Total Income 10,000 10,000 10,000 
 
Outflow (N-Current Exp.) Amount Income Tax Cash Flow 
Labor (U.S. only) <1,000> <1,000> <1,000> 
Imports (IMU purchase) <4,000> <4,000> -- 
Capital Expenditures249 -- -- -- 
Total Expenses <5,000>  <9,000> 
Total Base  5,000 9,000 
 
Table V represents a more complex example by showing a corporation doing 
business in the United States and producing for domestic and foreign markets.  
The table also assumes that most foreign activities are conducted through 
corporations incorporated outside the United States. 
                                                 
 247. I.R.C. § 882 (2006) (income effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business); United 
States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, arts. 5, 7(1) (income derived from a 
permanent establishment in the United States).  If the foreign corporation failed to meet this 
threshold, it would not be subject to the territorial income tax regime of the United States with 
respect to its business income.  See supra text accompanying notes 91–93.  The U.S. corporation 
would be taxed nevertheless because it would be subject to worldwide taxation.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 91–93.  The foreign corporation, however, would still be subject to a 
destination-based cash flow tax even if it were not “doing business in the United States” as long 
as it made sales within the United States.  See Barker, supra note 14, at 692–93.  Where a foreign 
corporation imports products into the United States and sells them directly to retail outlets, under 
a destination-based cash flow tax, one of two possibilities exist.  Either the retail establishments 
would not be entitled to a deduction for the cost of these goods, where the foreign corporation 
was not taxable, or the foreign corporation would pay tax on these goods without deduction.  For 
the latter, the U.S. retailer would be entitled to a deduction.  In either case, the full value (or cost) 
of the imports would be taxed.  See id. at 695–96. 
 248. To make the illustration simpler, TABLE IV adopts the R-type cash flow system, which 
exempts or eliminates consideration of all capital flows, both debt and equity. 
 249. The assumption is that all capital expenditures are foreign and their cost is reflected in 
the value of the imports. 
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TABLE V 
Comparison of Present U.S. Corporate Income Tax System with Simple R-Type 
Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax on Corporations 
Inflow (Income) Amount Income Tax
R-Type Cash 
Flow 
Gross income from sales, rents, 
royalties, sales of business assets 
 
U.S. consumption 20,000 20,000 20,000 
Exported 4,000 4,000 0 
Interest 100 100 0 
TOTAL INCOME 24,100 24,100 20,000 
 
Outflow (Expenses) Amount Income Tax Cash Flow 
Labor: 
     U.S. 
     Foreign 
<5,000> 
<2,000> 
<5,000> 
<2,000> 
<5,000> 
-- 
Cost of Goods and Services <4,000> <4,000> <4,000> 
Interest (Domestic) <500> <500> -- 
Dividends <500> -- -- 
Depreciation (U.S. & Foreign) <750> <750> -- 
CURRENT EXPENSES <12,250> <9,000> 
 
OUTFLOW 5,000 9,000 
Capital Expenditures 
     Domestic source 
     Foreign source 
<2,000> 
<400> 
-- 
-- 
<2,000> 
-- 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS <12,250> <11,000> 
TOTAL BASE 11,850 9,000 
 
Tax at 35% 4,147.50 3,150 
Foreign Tax Credit 630.00 -- 
(35% net inc.) 
TOTAL TAX 3,517.50 3,150 
 
Table IV presents a simple case of an importer of goods that has very little 
activity in the United States.250  Table V presents the more complex case of a 
corporation that has both imports and exports.251  Interest expense has been 
                                                 
 250. See supra TABLE IV. 
 251. See supra TABLE V. 
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downplayed in these tables to focus attention on the role of imports, exports, 
and capital expenditures.  Under both systems, all costs of production within 
the United States are deductible.252 
The R&F-type adds the consequences of financial transactions to the 
calculation of the tax base.253  Table VI illustrates the modifications that would 
be made to Table V where the R&F-type cash flow tax is applied.254 
 
TABLE VI 
Modification of Table V Using R&F-Type Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax 
Add to Inflows Amount Cash Flow (R&F) 
Interest and Dividends 100 100 
Debt Capital (Loans) 750 750 
Equity Capital 100 100 
 
Total Additions 950 
New Subtotal 20,950 
Current Deductions (No Change) <9,000> 
Add to Outflows 
Loan Repayment Principal <50> <50> 
Interest <500> <500> 
Capital distributed 0 0 
Dividends distributed <100> <100> 
Additional Deductions <650> 
Total Tax Base (R&F) 11,300 
TAX (35%) 3,955 
 
These tables illustrate the difference in scope of a destination-based cash 
flow tax.  Because the tax base is domestic consumption, the tax base includes 
only sales in the U.S., ignores foreign investment sales and expenditures, and 
permits deductions for all U.S. produced goods and services, but not for 
imports.255  It allows deductions even where the products or services produced 
are exported because exports do not represent domestic consumption and 
includes capital flows as they relate to domestic consumption.256  It taxes the 
income from business operations.257  The consequence is that the R&F-type 
                                                 
 252. See supra TABLE V. 
 253. See supra notes 230–36 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra TABLE V; see also infra TABLE VI. 
 255. See supra TABLES V–VI. 
 256. See supra TABLES V–VI. 
 257. See supra TABLES V–VI. 
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cash flow tax excludes the normal returns from capital and captures the 
supernormal returns from capital consumed in the United States no matter what 
the original source.258 
III. CASH FLOW TAXATION AND THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL INCOME 
The essential difference in outcome between cash flow or consumption-style 
taxes and income taxes is that cash flow taxes reduce the tax burden on 
capital.259  The way cash flow taxes relieve the tax on capital depends on the 
actual method chosen for measuring the tax base.260  When analyzing the 
income generated by capital, it is helpful to start with the possibility that a 
taxpayer may choose an investment with a practically certain return.  This 
return is known as the risk-free return on capital.261 
The actual risk-free interest rate is known as the nominal rate.262  This can be 
viewed as including both a real rate of return and an inflationary component.263  
Where inflation exists, an investor must reduce the nominal rate by the rate of 
inflation to determine the true profit.264  Historically, the real risk-free rate of 
return has been less than 1%.265  The U.S. income tax system taxes nominal 
interest.266  This includes a tax on the inflationary component of the return, 
which is not a tax on real income.267  Taxing the inflationary component can 
tax capital, which is not the purpose of an income tax.268 
To illustrate, where a taxpayer loans $100.00 at a 4% nominal rate, after one 
year the taxpayer has $100.00 of principal and $4.00 of interest pre-tax.  The 
after-tax result at a 35% tax rate is $102.60 ($100.00 principal and $4.00 
interest minus tax of $1.40 (35% of $4.00)).  Were the rate of inflation 3%, the 
real, inflation-adjusted value of $100.00 at the end of one year is $103.00 and 
the real rate of return would be .97%.269  Therefore, after taxes of $1.40, the 
taxpayer has $102.60, which is a real loss in the value of his or her capital.  
                                                 
 258. See supra TABLES V–VI. 
 259. See How Much Capital Taxed, supra note 4, at 1. 
 260. See generally id. (providing a comprehensive examination of the effect of cash flow 
taxes on the taxation of capital and  applying different economic assumptions). 
 261. See Cunningham, supra note 160, at 20–21.  An investment in U.S. Treasury bills is the 
paradigm for a risk-free return.  See id. at 21 & n.23. 
 262. LAURENCE M. BALL, MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 77 (2d ed. 2012). 
 263. See id. (“The real interest rate is the nominal rate minus the inflation rate.”). 
 264. See id. 
 265. See BRADFORD, supra note 4, at 12; see also Bankman & Griffith, supra note 4, at  
387–88. 
 266. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 4, at 391–92. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. This is calculated by dividing the interest of 1 by the inflation adjusted principal of 103.  
The formula can be set out as follows: Nominal = ((1 + Real) / (1 + Inflation)) – 1.  See 
IBBOTSON SBBI 2009 CLASSIC YEARBOOK: MARKET RESULTS FOR STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS, AND 
INFLATION 1926-2008, at 81 (2009). 
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Not only has the income tax taken the taxpayer’s entire real return, it has 
actually reduced the taxpayer’s capital.  In terms of general income tax 
principles, this makes no sense.270 
Both R- and R&F-type cash flow taxes eliminate the tax on inflationary 
gains from capital.271  With regard to financial instruments, an R-type cash 
flow tax is a yield-exempt system for purposes of financial transactions.272  In 
the example above, the $4.00 of interest would simply not be taxed with the 
result that the taxpayer would have $104.00 after tax.273   
The R&F-type cash flow tax also eliminates the tax on inflationary gains.274  
In the example above, the taxpayer who has $100 to invest after taxes would 
actually invest $153.85 before taxes.275  Because $153.85 would be deductible, 
assuming a 35% tax rate, the taxpayer would receive a refund of $53.85, 
making the out-of-pocket investment only $100.00.  $153.85 at 4% would 
yield $6.15 in one year.  Assuming the taxpayer relinquished her investment at 
the end of one year, he or she would be taxed on $160.00, which would include 
the original investment of $153.85 plus interest of $6.15.  A tax of 35% on 
$160.00 would be $56.00, leaving $104.00 after taxes. 
In the example above, regardless of the method utilized, the taxpayer would 
be in the same post-tax position.276  The two methods exempt the entire  
risk-free return on capital including the inflationary component of income.277  
This distinguishes consumption-type taxes from income taxes that, in contrast, 
do tax the risk-free return from capital.278 
The different cash flow methods, however, do not always reach the same 
result because their different methodologies can profoundly affect the actual 
taxation of capital income.279  The R- and R&F-type are only economically 
equivalent under certain assumptions: the ex ante perspective of the present 
value of the expected return on the investment.280  One way to illustrate the 
                                                 
 270. See Daniel Halperin & Eugene Steuerle, Indexing the Tax System for Inflation, in 
UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME CONSUMPTION TAX 347, 348–53 
(Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988) (arguing that inflation should not be taxed under an ideal 
income tax). 
 271. See supra Part II.C. 
 272. See supra Part II.C. 
 273. See supra Part II.C. 
 274. See supra Part II.C. 
 275. The idea is to determine the amount a taxpayer would invest in order to have a net cost 
after taxes of $100.00.  The formula for determining this amount is  
(100) / (1-tax rate) = investment before taxes. 
 276. Assuming risk-free rate of return at 4%. 
 277. See Barker, supra note 17, at 213 (stating that interest and dividends are not taxed in 
either an R- or R&F-type cash flow system). 
 278. See supra text accompanying notes 262–68. 
 279. See Barker, supra note 126, at 383 n.115 (citing THE MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 
230–33). 
 280. See Graetz, supra note 4, at 1602. 
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difference between a pure cash flow (R&F-type) and a hybrid cash flow  
(R-type) is to compare the treatment of a traditional Individual Retirement 
Account (IRA) and a Roth Individual Retirement Account (Roth IRA).281  A 
traditional IRA is a pure cash flow consumption tax under which all 
investments are deductible and all withdrawals are income.282  A Roth IRA, on 
the other hand, is a yield-exempt consumption tax, under which investments 
are not deductible and withdrawals are not income.283  Traditional IRAs are 
established with pre-tax contributions; Roth IRAs are established with post-tax 
contributions.284  For instance, assume a taxpayer that has $100.00 to invest 
pre-tax in an investment that is expected to return 10% in one year. Table VII 
compares the results where the return is positive.285 
 
TABLE VII 
Comparison of Income Tax, Roth IRA, Traditional IRA 
 Income Tax Roth IRA Traditional IRA 
Investment 70 (after 30% tax) 70 (after 30% tax) 100 (no tax) 
Interest (10% per annum) 7 7 10 
Total Before Tax 77 77 110 
Tax 2.1 0 33 
Total After Tax 74.9 77 77 
 
Both IRAs are the economic equivalent even if the investments realized a 
loss.286  Table VIII compares the results where the return on this investment is 
negative.287 
 
TABLE VIII 
 Income Tax Roth IRA Traditional IRA 
Investment 70 (after 30% tax) 70 (after 30% tax) 100 (no tax) 
Interest/Loss <35> <35> 50 
Total Before Tax 35 35 50 
Tax 10.5 (refund) -- <15> 
Total After Tax 45.5 35 35 
                                                 
 281. See I.R.C. § 408 (2006) (general provisions of IRAs); see also id. § 408A (general 
provisions for Roth IRAs); id. § 219 (deductibility of contributions to traditional IRAs). 
 282. See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Lipstick, Light Beer, and Back-Loaded 
Savings Accounts, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1101, 1110 (2006). 
 283. See id. 
 284. See id. at 1112. 
 285. See infra TABLE VII (showing a positive return from the initial investment regardless of 
whether a Roth IRA or  a traditional IRA is used). 
 286. See infra TABLE VIII. 
 287. See infra TABLE VIII. 
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Tables VII and VIII illustrate a situation where the results under both Roth 
and traditional IRAs are identical even where the actual results vary from the 
expected results.288  This only holds true under certain assumptions and may 
not be true in many cases.289  Both an income tax and a cash flow tax, like a 
traditional IRA, tax actual results, not projected results because they are  
post-paid taxes.290  In contrast, a yield-exempt consumption tax, like a Roth 
IRA, taxes anticipated results because it is a pre-paid tax.291  In some cases, 
there can be a considerable difference between expected results and actual 
results.  For example, were the tax rates to change from the time of the 
investment to the time of withdrawal one year later, the effect on total return 
would be quite different.  Table IX illustrates this result. 
 
TABLE IX 
 Income Tax Roth IRA Traditional IRA 
Investment 70 (after 30% tax) 70 (after 30% tax) 100 (no tax) 
Interest (10% per annum) 7 7 10 
Total Before Tax 77 77 110 
Tax (at 40%) 2.8 0 44 
Total After Tax 74.2 77 66 
 
Pre-paying the tax in contrast to post-paying the tax adds another dimension 
of risk and return to the cash flow versus yield-exempt comparison when there 
is a difference in the tax rate from the start of the investment to the end.292 
The different timing of the methods can also dramatically change outcomes 
depending on what the taxpayer does with the tax savings.  Assume once again 
that the taxpayer has $100.00 pre-tax to invest.  Under a yield-exempt 
approach, the taxpayer has only $70.00 to invest because the taxpayer pays 
$30.00 in tax to the government.293  Under a cash flow tax approach, the 
$100.00 available for investment is composed of $70.00 plus $30.00 in tax 
savings, which are attributed to the deduction of the investment.294  As 
demonstrated in Tables VIII and IX, cash flow and yield-exempt are equivalent 
only where the tax savings available are invested at the same time and in an 
                                                 
 288. See supra TABLES VII–VIII. 
 289. See Linda Sugin, Sustaining Progressivity in the Budget Process: Commentary on Gale 
& Orszag’s An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in the Bush Administration, 2001–2004, 45 
B.C. L. REV. 1259, 1268 (2004). 
 290. Burke & McCouch, supra note 282, at 1112. 
 291. Id. 
 292. See supra TABLE IX. 
 293. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 282, at 1110, 1112; see also supra TABLES  
VII–VIII. 
 294. See supra TABLES VII–VIII. 
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investment with the same return, whether positive or negative.295  Assuming 
the taxpayer was to invest the $30 in tax savings differently, the tax on capital 
income would also be different.296 
Because these tax savings are, in a sense, on temporary loan from the 
government and must eventually be repaid, the taxpayer may choose a 
different investment of the $30 in tax savings for several reasons.  First, 
taxpayers might be more risk adverse with what is owed in future taxes and 
consciously choose a less risky investment with a smaller return.  A second 
possibility is that the savings might not be immediately available for taxpayers 
to invest in the same investment because they will only receive those savings 
from the government in the future as a tax refund.  Borrowing the additional 
$30 during the delay and incurring additional risk may not be financially wise 
or acceptable to the taxpayer.  A third possibility is that taxpayers might not 
have sufficient income immediately available to provide a full tax offset from 
the deduction, which could delay the tax refund.297  Under any of these 
scenarios, the tax savings will likely be placed in a different investment at a 
different time, where the risk and the rate of return may differ and the taxpayer 
will have lost some of the time use of his or her money. 
Table X illustrates simultaneous investments with two different positive 
rates of return.298  Table XI illustrates what would occur in Table X if the 
investment of the tax savings were delayed six months.299  Table XII assumes a 
loss in the first investment and a positive return from the tax savings.300  In 
each case, when the investment of the tax refund is delayed, the return for the 
investment of the tax savings is reduced.301 
 
TABLE X 
 Cash Flow Exempt 
Investment 70 30 70 
Interest 7 (10%) 1.50 (5%) 7 
Total Before Taxes 77 31.50 77 
Subtotal 108.50 77 
Tax 32.55 0 
Total After Tax 75.95 77 
                                                 
 295. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 282, at 1110; see also supra TABLES VII–VIII. 
 296. See infra TABLES X, XII (showing how the taxes vary when the taxpayer invests $30 of 
tax savings differently than the initial $70). 
 297. See E. Cary Brown, Business Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME, 
EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300, 301–06 
(Lloyd A. Metzler et al. eds., 1948) (recognizing the importance of full-loss offsets). 
 298. See infra TABLE X. 
 299. See infra TABLE XI. 
 300. See infra TABLE XII. 
 301. See infra TABLES X–XII. 
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TABLE XI 
 Cash Flow Exempt 
Investment 70 30 70 
Interest 7 (10%) .75 (5%, ½ year) 7 
Total Before Taxes 77 30.75 77 
Subtotal 107.75 77 
Tax 32.32 0 
Total After Tax 75.43 77 
 
 
TABLE XII 
 Cash Flow Exempt 
Investment 70 30 70 
Interest <35> 1.50 (5% Int.) <35> 
Total Before Taxes 35 31.50 35 
Subtotal 66.50 35 
Tax 19.95 0 
Total After Tax 46.55 35 
 
The key to these results is whether or not the tax is pre-paid or post-paid.  A 
tax can be said to be pre-paid because the taxpayer’s investment is out of 
earnings available for present consumption.  Because the investment is not 
initially deducted, the consumption, even though it is postponed to the future, 
is fully taxed.  This is why, in Table VII, where the taxpayer earned $100.00, 
he or she only had $70.00 (after a $30.00 tax) to invest.302  Although the 
taxpayer has not yet consumed, the present value of the future consumption is 
$100.00.303  The yield-exempt model operates prospectively by taxing future 
consumption today at its present value.304  Because the government has fully 
received its tax today on future consumption, it has no stake in the actual 
outcome.305 
                                                 
 302. See supra TABLE VII. 
 303. See James R. Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1165 (2008) (noting that, under a pre-paid tax, return on investment is not 
affected). 
 304. See id. 
 305. Cf. Cunningham, supra note 160, at 24.  Under the pre-paid tax the government bears no 
interest in the outcome, unlike under a post-paid tax where the government has a stake in the 
return on a capital investment. 
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The cash flow model, in contrast, operates retrospectively, waiting to tax 
consumption when it occurs.306  Thus, the $100.00 invested is treated as 
investment, not consumption, with its quality as future consumption ignored.307  
Consequently, the $100.00 is excluded from the tax base under the cash flow 
model.308  All receipts are included in the tax base, but will be offset by 
deductions as long as they are invested and not consumed.309  Thus, a cash 
flow tax is post-paid; it is paid when the taxpayer recovers capital and 
profits.310  By deducting the investment when made, the cash flow tax 
anticipates the entire loss of the taxpayer’s capital.311  If neither income nor 
capital is returned, there will be no tax.312 
In a cash flow tax, the government must wait for its tax.313  Because the tax 
base in a cash flow tax excludes the original $100.00, one way of looking at it 
is that the government refunds its tax of $30.00, thus making the government, 
in a sense, a silent partner with the taxpayer.314  The government puts its 
deferred tax revenue at the taxpayer’s disposal.315  The tax savings are only 
temporarily on loan from the government, which shares in the profits and 
losses of the taxpayer’s investment.316  The government, unlike the case of a 
yield-exempt pre-paid approach, is a stakeholder.317 
The analogy to a partnership between the taxpayer and government is not 
perfect.  The government is not an active partner because the taxpayer controls 
the investment of the government’s tax money without the government’s 
input.318  Where the taxpayer puts the government’s tax money ($30.00) in the 
same investment as the taxpayer’s money ($70.00), then the government bears 
all of the risks and benefits of its investment of $30.00 in the original 
investment, and the taxpayer bears all of the risks and benefits of her 
investment of $70.00.  That is why yield-exempt and cash flow methods 
produce the same results in Tables VII and VIII.319  However, under a cash 
flow tax where the taxpayer invests the tax savings in a different investment, 
                                                 
 306. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 1116; see also David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of 
Risk, 58 TAX L. REV. 1, 21 (2004). 
 307. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 1116; see also Weisbach, supra note 306, at 21–22. 
 308. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 1116. 
 309. See id. at 1116, 1179.  TABLE VII demonstrates this outcome: the taxpayer reports the 
full amount of the retuned investment of $100.00 plus the $10.00 of income earned.  See supra 
TABLE VII. 
 310. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 282, at 1112. 
 311. See Cunningham, supra note 160, at 25. 
 312. See id. 
 313. See id. at 24. 
 314. See id. at 25. 
 315. See id. 
 316. See id. 
 317. See id. 
 318. See supra note 314 and accompanying text. 
 319. See supra TABLES VII–VIII. 
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the government’s investment is a percentage of the total return of each 
investment.320 
Traditional IRAs and Roth IRAs serve as good comparisons to the cash flow 
and yield-exempt models because they are close economic equivalents for 
taxpayers due to similar funding practicalities.  Where the IRAs are funded 
through regular payroll savings plans, the investment, whether pre- or post-tax, 
flows into the same investment, creating present value equivalents.321  Because 
the future investments of earnings will be channeled into the same investments 
tax-free, their actual future post-tax results would also be the same assuming 
the same effective rate of tax.322 
Corporations, however, do not fit this pattern.  Corporations are 
continuously making new investments with new debt capital and retained 
earnings, including tax savings.323  Returns can vary considerably and tax 
savings may be delayed due to the inability to currently utilize net losses.324  
Additionally, corporations do not fit precise molds.  Even many non-financial 
businesses have large holdings of cash and other financial assets.325  Thus, the 
differences between real world outcomes and expected outcomes can 
dramatically affect the nature of corporate consumption taxes.  In the corporate 
setting, one must consider what consumption taxes do and do not do with 
respect to the taxation of capital income. 
Consideration of these different methods demonstrates the inherent 
difficulties in understanding the full implications of taxing capital income in 
the consumption context.  To see this, economists view capital income as 
having three components: the riskless rate of return, the risk premium, and the 
supernormal return or economic rents.326 
The riskless rate of return is the guaranteed rate on receipts without chance 
of default.327  The riskless rate of return is exempt from cash flow and  
yield-exempt taxes, but is fully taxed by income taxes.328  The risk premium is 
the additional return expected by investors to compensate them for  
risk-taking.329  It is generally believed that the risk premium is not subject to 
                                                 
 320. See supra TABLE X. 
 321. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 282, at 1110. 
 322. See id. (noting that the “theoretical equivalence” between the pre-tax and post-tax 
treatments is destroyed without a “uniform, invariable rate of tax”). 
 323. See Steven A. Bank, Dividends and Tax Policy in the Long Run, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 
533, 556 (2007) (discussing the sources of a firm’s capital). 
 324. Cf. Cunningham, supra note 160, at 39 n.78. 
 325. See Ben Casselman & Justin Lahart, Companies Shun Investment, Hoard Cash, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 17, 2011, at A2. 
 326. Cunningham, supra note 160, at 23.  Professor Cunningham also notes the need to 
eventually address an inflation premium.  Id. at 23 n.32. 
 327. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 4, at 387 & n.27 (likening a risk-free rate of return 
to the guaranteed interest derived from short-term treasury bills). 
 328. See Elkins & Hanna, supra note 160, at 103–04. 
 329. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 4, at 387–88 & n.30. 
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either cash flow or yield-exempt consumption taxes.330  Often it is argued that 
under certain assumptions, sophisticated investors can avoid the income tax on 
the risk premium by changing one’s portfolio in favor of riskier investments.331 
Economic rents, or inframarginal returns, are those yields above the risk-free 
and risk premium components.332  Economic rents are subject to both income 
taxation and cash flow taxation,333 but are not subject to taxation under the 
yield-exempt model, because the tax is pre-paid on the basis of expected, not 
actual, returns.334  Because economic rents are unexpected and cannot be 
anticipated by the investor, they are not caught by a yield-exempt tax on 
expected returns, but are subject to tax under cash flow principles.335  
Economic rents would only be exempt if the investor could invest her tax 
savings in a way that would earn economic rents of the same magnitude as the 
original investment.336 
Although the comparison of cash flow and yield-exempt consumption 
systems with traditional and Roth IRAs aids in demonstrating how 
consumption taxes work, conclusions must be reached carefully.337  Roth or 
traditional IRAs are contrasting devices that will usually reach the exact same 
result with the exception of changing tax rates.338  The analysis applies well to 
non-entrepreneurial investors because any economic rent is in the nature of a 
windfall to capital.339  Taxing businesses, however, is not so straightforward.  
Corporations, unlike other investors, are in the business of earning economic 
rents.340   
Economic rents are included in the tax base of an R&F-type tax because it is 
a pure cash flow tax that incorporates actual returns.341  The result under an  
R-type tax is less predictable because the R-type is a hybrid cash flow tax;342 it 
is a cash flow tax for most types of business income and operating 
                                                 
 330. See Cunningham, supra note 160, at 26; see also Elkins & Hanna, supra note 160, at 
103; How Much Capital Taxed, supra note 4, at 2–4. 
 331. This is based on a somewhat impractical pair of assumptions that a taxpayer can and 
will increase his or her debt and can and will increase his or her exposure to risky investments in 
order to undo the effects of the income tax.  See Cunningham, supra note 160, at 29–30. 
 332. Id. at 23. 
 333. Id. at 24. 
 334. See How Much Capital Taxed, supra note 4, at 6. 
 335. See id. at 5. 
 336. When considering non-entrepreneurial investors, it may be reasonable to conclude that 
economic rents are so unusual that these investors would normally never see them.  For this 
reason, the relevance of economic rents to the comparison of cash flow taxes is minimal for  
non-entrepreneurial investors.  See Cunningham, supra note 160, at 23–24. 
 337. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 282, at 1116. 
 338. Id. at 1113. 
 339. See Elkins & Hanna, supra note 160, at 100 & n.36 (quoting Warren, supra note 4, at 5). 
 340. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 341. See Barker, supra note 17, at 214. 
 342. See id. at 213; see also supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
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expenditures but a yield-exempt tax for financial flows.343  An R-type does not 
include the economic rents generated by financial flows.344  The R- and  
R&F-type would reach identical outcomes when a business does not have rents 
from financial operations.345  Because the actual tax outcome would depend on 
the unique mix of financial and non-financial activities of each business under 
an R-type, the R&F-type presents a superior solution for all corporations.346 
IV. THE POLITICS AND POLICY OF CORPORATE TAXATION 
Any proposed corporate tax system must deal with the question: “Why tax 
corporations on income?”  Both income and cash flow taxes tax income in 
some way.  An ideal income tax taxes the entire return on capital only from 
equity in the corporate setting.347  Cash flow taxes tax economic rents, or true 
profits, while excluding the normal return on equity as well as debt.348  
Whether the tax base is the normal return from capital, economic rents, or 
both, these income components can also be in the tax base of shareholders.349 
The justification for corporate taxation of income should reflect the 
underlying nature of a corporation.  There are several schools of thought.  One 
approach views the corporation as merely the aggregate of its owners.350  This 
view leads to the widespread belief that taxing corporations offers a convenient 
and practical way of indirectly taxing corporate shareholders.351  Because there 
are fewer corporations than shareholders, corporate tax presents an easier 
method of tax collection.352  In addition, corporate taxes provide an effective 
way of taxing foreign shareholders.353  In sum, the aggregate view supports 
corporate taxation as a substitute, or surrogate, for shareholder taxation.  If 
there were an effective way to directly tax shareholders, there would be no 
need for corporate taxation. 
The aggregate theory of corporations is not without deficiencies, thus 
leading some scholars to a different theory of corporate taxation known as the 
agency theory.354  This theory analyzes how the pass-through tax consequences 
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of different corporate investments would impact management and some 
shareholders differently.355  Consequently, management and shareholders may 
not agree on an investment strategy.356  The corporate tax places all equity 
holders in the same position in regard to different corporate investments.357  
There is no need for the shareholders to agree.  The tax on the shareholder’s 
agent—the corporation—is incurred by the shareholder in exchange for the 
corporation bearing the direct tax consequences of corporate activities, thus 
avoiding those direct tax consequences that might not be in the shareholders’ 
interests.358 
Another approach to the nature of corporations is the artificial entity theory, 
which views the corporation as a creature of the state.359  Therefore, it is 
reasonable for the state to impose a charge or a tax for the privilege of doing 
business in corporate form.360  Though this rationale supports an independent 
basis for taxing corporations, it neither demonstrates any relationship between 
the benefit received and the payment due nor accounts for the fact that many of 
the same benefits are provided to unincorporated entities.361  Although this 
view recognizes corporate uniqueness, it does not provide a convincing 
argument for how corporations should be taxed. 
The most modern approach is the real entity view, which views the 
corporation as an entity distinct from its owners.362  This represents a modern 
view of finance and economics: owners are separated from the thing they own 
and managers are really in control of the enterprise.363  Owners are no longer 
“classical merchant adventurers” who combine their capital and talents, but 
instead are true stockholders investing capital with professional 
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administrators.364  In general, “[s]tockholders act like an unorganized, usually 
inert, political constituency.”365  Management wields the real power of 
corporations.  The thought is that taxation of corporations is the result of the 
recognition of corporate independence and power. 
This view leads to two justifications for corporate taxation.  First, 
independent corporations have a separate ability to pay, and such control of 
resources is a sufficient basis for taxation without regard to the tax’s incidence 
on shareholders or others.366  Second, taxation is required to control and 
regulate the power of management.367  In a world where corporations have 
become the most significant global economic force, taxation provides a 
mechanism for popular control. 
Though these rival theories of corporate essence are expressed in terms of 
their superior insights and truth value, each approaches the question of 
corporate tax from a different viewpoint.  The aggregate theory relies upon the 
contractual and legal relations between corporations and their shareholders.368  
This perspective justifies corporate tax only as a substitute for shareholder 
taxation—a second best solution at most.369 
The artificial entity theory is predicated on the legal relations between 
corporations and the government.370  Entity taxation, though justified by this 
approach, stands on rather flimsy grounds.371  A license fee makes more sense 
under this justification.372 
The real entity theory takes the perspective of modern corporate economic 
reality.373  This theory dismisses shareholders as irrelevant and leaves the 
corporation as a free entity possessing the capacity to pay taxes.374  However, 
the most recent version of this theory shies away from the conclusion that this 
provides a significant justification for corporate tax.375  Instead, the real entity 
theory introduces public interest as a justification for taxing corporations, that 
is, to regulate the enormous power of these entities in the public interest.376  
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Thus, corporate taxation is not economically justified, but politically required.  
Taxation, once again, becomes a second-best solution. 
It would be a mistake to dwell on the exclusivity of the approaches and fail 
to appreciate the contribution they each make to our understanding of the 
nature of corporations.  The various perspectives of law, contracts, and 
economics are valid in terms of the different ways corporations interact with 
society and governments.377  These perspectives help explain why nations 
uniformly apply income tax to corporations; yet none of the approaches 
explains why any particular type of tax is appropriate for corporate taxation.378 
None of these theories properly tackle the unique problems of corporate 
taxation, which encompasses not only the taxation of corporations, but also the 
taxation of shareholders.379  Practically all countries tax corporations and their 
shareholders in a way that results in economic double taxation of the same 
income.380  Many countries have sought ways to reduce the burden of 
economic double taxation, but none have eliminated it completely.381  
However, none of the theories highlighted above—from pre-payment on behalf 
of shareholders to taxation as a means to regulate corporate  
management—adequately justify double taxation.382 
The late Professor Richard Musgrave and Peggy Musgrave provided the 
classic argument against corporate double taxation in their work on public 
finance.383  In dismissing taxation based on the notion “that a corporation has 
an ability to pay of its own and should be subject to a distinct tax,” they said, 
Obviously, all taxes must in the end fall on somebody, i.e., natural 
persons.  Corporate profits are part of the income of the shareholders 
and, in the spirit of the accretion approach to the income tax, should 
be taxed as part of their income.  There is no reason why they should 
either bear an extra tax or be given preferred treatment.384 
Although the case for corporate double taxation has been problematic, the 
case for general corporate taxation is very strong.  Though there may be 
disagreement over the reasons behind such a tax, most, including the 
Musgraves, recognize its merit.385  Corporate tax in practice is based on a 
strong political consensus.  The public requires corporations to pay taxes 
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because corporations present a good source of revenue and it is perceived to be 
just to tax bodies with control over large resources.386 
Does a consumption tax imposed on corporations in lieu of an income tax 
more adequately satisfy fundamental notions of fairness?  In general, it is 
thought to be fair to tax individuals on what he or she takes out of society 
under a consumption tax.387  Also, nations tax individuals on income because it 
is thought to be fair to tax people based on their ability to pay taxes, with 
income considered the most practical base for measuring economic capacity.388  
In this way, people are fairly taxed in accordance with their use of total societal 
resources.  This is based on the idea that people are members of societies, and 
with that right (and the benefits that flow from it), come certain unique 
obligations.389  Therefore, all individuals making use of society’s  
benefits—both citizens and non-citizen residents alike—must pay their equal 
share of taxes.390 
In contrast, corporations do not consume in the same way as individuals.  
Corporations have control over resources, but, as artificial persons, their 
relation to the state and society cannot be described in the same way as 
individuals.391  Despite these differences, income tax treats corporations like 
individual residents or citizens.392  This status has been defined in various 
ways.  Corporations have been taxed on their income on the basis of formal 
criteria such as legal status, place of incorporation, location of the principal 
officers or board of directors, or on the basis of a more practical economic link 
like principal place of business, or seat (location of principal officers).393  
These approaches to corporate residency begin with a common viewpoint: a 
corporation owes allegiance to a state in the same manner as an individual 
does. 
Corporations, as artificial persons, have many options regarding place of 
incorporation or residence.394  Corporate residency can often be manipulated 
for tax reasons and many corporations will avoid tax if they can.395  In a world 
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where many of the factors of production are highly mobile, governments will 
encourage migration with their laws and tax incentives.396 
Corporations are different from individuals and standards of fairness should 
encompass those differences.  The essence of the individual’s relationship is 
totality; individuals are social, political, and economic actors.  The essence of a 
corporation’s relationship is primarily economic.397  Consequently, effective 
corporate taxation should consider first—and perhaps only—economic 
justifications for tax. 
In other contexts, double taxation in various forms is endemic.  Nations first 
tax individuals on income and later tax those same individuals on funds left 
over after tax used for consumption.398  The difference between this pattern 
and corporate tax is that the latter two taxes are both income taxes. 
It is one thing to justify a tax on corporations for the reasons set out above, 
where, in reality, the tax paid is “on account” of the ultimate obligation of its 
shareholders.399  It is quite another to impose a tax on corporations that results 
in economic double taxation of the same income.400  It is not enough to rest the 
case for double taxation “on a nagging feeling that corporations, especially 
large publicly-held corporations, are aggregates of capital, legal entities and 
groups of managers . . . that have a capacity to pay.”401  A separate and distinct 
tax on corporations should be justified on the basis of the unique benefits that 
corporations derive from the state and from a country in general. 
Three questions must be considered.  First, do corporations receive unique 
benefits that justify the imposition of a separate and distinct tax?  Second, does 
the tax imposed fairly relate to or assess those benefits?  Third, is it fair to 
impose a distinct tax that the shareholders ultimately must pay, which results in 
a second charge for the same benefit? 
A.  Benefits of Corporate Status 
There are many features that make a corporation special, but limited liability 
is the historic key to the success of the corporation as a pivotal institution in 
society today.402  Limited liability has two interrelated functions.  It ensures 
that shareholders are not liable for the debts of their firm beyond their capital 
contributions.403  Consequently, it allows the firm to engage in risk-taking 
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while limiting consequences to the shareholders.404  This gives shareholders 
the potential opportunity to realize greater returns by investing in riskier 
enterprises.405  The opportunity to employ limited liability can also be 
considered a government subsidy or benefit.406  The Musgraves argue that, 
although limited liability is of tremendous value to a corporation, it is 
practically costless to society.407  Society, which includes the victims of 
corporate disasters, might not agree. 
An important consequence of limited liability is that it leads directly to the 
efficient provision of capital: “[E]conomists would view the availability of 
limited liability as an efficient way to organize the raising of large amounts of 
capital and allocating risks.”408  Limited liability has given corporations, 
especially those that are publicly traded, ready access to capital markets.409  
This liquidity provides firms with a lower cost of capital.410 
Corporate capital needs are, however, provided in different ways.  Studies 
indicate that there is very little market-raised equity, with one study finding 
that firms derive only 2 to 3% of their new capital from shareholders.411  Most 
corporate capital needs are derived from retained earnings, which are subject to 
a single layer of corporate tax, and debt, which is only subject to one layer of 
non-corporate tax.412  
Ultimately, what makes a corporate investment truly unique is its liquidity, 
which is made possible in part by the limited liability of shareholders and by 
the public market for securities, both stocks and bonds.413  Shares of stocks and 
corporate bonds can be turned into cash quickly through markets with high 
volume, and consequently there is great certainty in the price at the moment of 
sale because fluctuations in the price are low.414  Liquidity gives 
stockholders—and to a large extent bondholders—the ability to enjoy higher 
risk-adjusted returns from their investments than they would be able to from 
illiquid investments.415  Marketability of these types of investments gives 
investors the capacity to enjoy the benefits of long-term corporate investments 
without the long-term commitment.  Investors can choose the pattern of their 
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consumption by investing and divesting at any time.416  The state facilitates 
such benefits through the maintenance and regulation of the financial markets, 
which is essential for these opportunities to exist.417 
Liquidity has also resulted in the separation of control from stockholder 
ownership and vesting it in corporate management, granting management 
control over the affairs of the corporation with little serious interference.418  
Limited liability and liquidity have enabled investors to immunize their 
investments from those of the corporation.419  The combination of these factors 
has led to gargantuan business enterprises420 whose size alone gives 
corporations a “social significance”421 that cannot be attributed to smaller 
business enterprises.422 
Nevertheless, does the burden of the corporate tax fairly relate to the benefits 
derived by, and the nature of, the corporate enterprise?  Both an income tax 
and a cash flow tax reach the profits derived by corporate uniqueness,423 but 
income taxation is over-inclusive.424  As this Article will demonstrate, only a 
cash flow tax is limited to a tax on the unique profits earned by a corporation. 
B.  Cash Flow Tax as a Tax on the Unique Profits of Corporations 
An important normative goal of taxation is that taxes are to be fairly 
allocated among taxpayers.425  The general approach to fairness has 
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emphasized two distinct concepts of fairness: a taxpayer should be taxed in 
accordance with his or her ability to pay or a taxpayer should be taxed in 
accordance with the benefits he or she receives from society.426  Corporate tax 
cannot be merely a surrogate for the fair taxation of shareholders because it is a 
uniform tax on those who are otherwise in incomparable situations.  Justice 
requires that a tax on corporations stand on its own.427  This requires taxation 
on the basis of benefits received.428 
The present state of knowledge supports the assumption that corporations 
have the opportunity to make unique profits.  Though these unique profits are 
not certain, where they arise, unique profits would be a proper base for a 
separate and distinct tax on corporations.  These unique profits are called 
economic rents.429  In economic jargon, a tax on economic rents is a true net 
profits tax, allowing a deduction for the cost of all capital whether equity or 
debt.430  As outlined in Part II, a cash flow tax targets the return over and 
above the normal return from capital—the supernormal return or economic 
rents.431  Depending on one’s assumptions of taxpayer behavior, the income 
tax taxes part or all of the normal return from capital.432  The income tax also 
overtaxes the risk-free return due to its inclusion of non-real inflationary gains 
in the tax base.433  
To many investors, economic rents can be a windfall to financial 
investment.434  To those lucky few that can uncover investments with 
economic rents, those gains are the product of the special talents or ingenuity 
of the investor and are only tangentially related to a return on capital.435  
Corporations, in contrast, are engaged in entrepreneurial and business activity, 
which is essentially the business of earning rents.436  Corporations earn 
economic rents in the global world “by cost leadership, by product 
differentiation, and by focus[ing] on . . . particular market niche[s].”437  
Economic rents are also often associated with monopoly power.438  There are 
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five aspects of corporate structure that determine which firms are able to earn 
economic rents over the long haul.  These factors are a “rivalry among existing 
competitors, the likelihood of new competition, the threat of substitutes, and 
the bargaining power both of suppliers and customers.”439 
Firms evaluate new projects in terms of economic rents, which can be 
calculated by determining the Net Present Value (NPV) of a project.440  A 
positive NPV is a return greater than the cost of capital.441  Economic value is 
added to the firm where income earned from a project exceeds the cost of 
capital multiplied by the investment.442  In the case of debt financing, NPV is 
the present value of the expected stream of income minus depreciation less the 
present value of interest and principle payments.443  In this way, the investment 
adds value to the firm if there is residual income, also known as Economic 
Value Added.444 
The expected return is the normal return, which includes a risk-free return 
plus a risk premium.445  This is the opportunity cost of capital that represents 
the expected return for an equally risky investment.446  Put another way, it is 
the return investors expect for waiting and taking risks.447  This presents a 
conundrum.  Shareholders are not interested in just any return but in an 
investment producing economic rents, that is an NPV investment, which is 
greater than a normal return.448  Yet shareholders only expect a normal return 
that includes a premium for the level of risk they assume.449  But this normal 
return is speculative because of the potential deviations in actual results that 
are caused by “the varying but statistically unpredictable fortunes of the 
firm.”450  Ownership of shares does not guarantee any return or even that a 
shareholder will recoup his or her capital.451 
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The consequence of corporate taxation is that shareholders get less.  Is this 
result acceptable double taxation?  Because economic rents are extraordinary, 
the opportunity to earn rents is not a serious factor in stock purchase and the 
possibility has little effect on shareholder behavior.452  Corporate rents are a 
windfall; their creation has nothing to do with the talents and skills of the 
stockholder.453  Human capital and monopoly power explain rents; 
supernormal returns are usually associated with the return from ideas, labor, 
and management skills, or market power.454  Stockholders are capital owners, 
not capital users.455  To the extent stockholders earn a normal return, they are 
compensated for the risks they bear.456  Though stockholders own the residual 
rights to rents, capital has not produced these rents—people have.457  Because 
rents are a windfall to shareholder capital, taxation is fair.458 
Those who purchase shares from others may be paying for previously earned 
economic rents, which would naturally be reflected in the value of the 
shares.459  The purchase price may also reflect the capital value of expected 
rents including the future tax cost at the corporate level.460  These same 
principles apply today to the income tax.461  Though these rents would not be a 
windfall to capital, having been expected and paid for, not taxing them would 
result in a tax windfall to the purchaser.462 
Logic dictates that shareholders realize rents through dividends or capital 
appreciation.  It is, however, unlikely that stockholders receive rents 
knowingly.  Many corporations do not pay any dividends, while other 
corporations pay them regularly.463  Dividends do not represent economic 
rents, but instead merely represent a portion of the expected normal return on 
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capital.464  Under a cash flow tax, the amount of profits representing dividends 
would not be subject to tax.465 
Indeed, in our system of stockholding, dividends are the only instance when 
the reality of corporate earnings intrudes into the daily life of shareholders.466  
Common sense suggests that a record of dividend paying will have an impact 
on stock valuation,467 yet economists have three contradictory views.  On the 
right, it is asserted that the payment of dividends increases the value of the firm 
(even though assets leave the corporate solution).468  On the left, it is asserted 
that the payment of dividends decreases the value of shares.469  In the middle, 
it is asserted that the payment of dividends has no effect.470  This lack of 
theoretical consensus and supporting meaningful data suggest that there is 
disconnect between corporate share value and distributed corporate profits. 
The effect of economic rents on share value is even more problematic than 
that of dividends.  Rents are elusive, ephemeral, and are not a factor when the 
only relevant concerns when investing in shares are price and dividends.471  It 
was the late Adolf Berle who suggested that there was, at best, an indirect 
correlation between share value and the value of a corporation as an operating 
entity.472  Berle concluded that “the stock market[] . . .  [is a] more or less 
closed, system of property-holding . . . that . . . is essentially independent from 
the actual productive processes.”473 
                                                 
 464. Expected returns on shares of stock based on historical data include both an income 
element (paid as a dividend) and a much larger element for capital appreciation.  See IBBOTSON, 
supra note 269, at 23.  It is this return composed of a risk-free rate plus a risk premium that is 
exempt from taxation at the corporate level under a cash flow tax.  These “profits” would only be 
subject to one level of tax at the shareholder level. 
 465. See supra notes 178, 464 and accompanying text. 
 466. See Berle, supra note 363, at 39. 
 467. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 420. 
 468. See id. at 428 (arguing that, because investors seek stocks with established dividends, 
those stocks command higher prices). 
 469. See id. at 429–30 (arguing that, because investors prefer the tax advantages of capital 
gains, stocks with dividend polices have depressed prices). 
 470. See id. at 433. 
 471. See Berle, supra note 363, at 39. 
 472. Id. at 37–38. 
 473. Id. at 38–39.  In some cases, there exists indirect correlation between the risks and 
benefits of stock ownership and the risks and benefits of corporate assets.  John H. Davies, Public 
Stock, Private Stock: A Model for the Corporate Income Tax, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 299, 309 (1975).  
This indirect correlation results from the specific risks borne by shareholders due to specific 
industry risks or the unique properties of particular corporations.  See BREALEY ET AL., supra 
note 430, at 162.  This is known as unique risk.  See id.  Though unique risk is accounted for in 
the risk premium, it is not particularly important risk because it can be minimized by 
diversification.  See BRADFORD, supra note 4, at 10 (explaining the normal return as accounting 
for the particular risks of the firm); see also BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 162.  The most 
significant risk for most shareholders is market risk, which is also known as systemic risk.  Id. at 
162 & n.27.  Systemic risk generally springs from external macroeconomic factors that affect all 
companies in a particular fashion, albeit with different magnitudes.  See IBBOTSON, supra note 
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The publicly traded corporation is a unique form of ownership in that “[i]t 
has destroyed the unity that we commonly call property—has divided 
ownership into nominal ownership and the power formerly joined to it.”474  
Many stockholders own shares indirectly through mutual funds and pension 
plans run by corporate management with little idea of the companies they own, 
let alone the risks and benefits of the individual companies contained in their 
portfolios.475 
The substantial disconnect between the underlying assets and business 
activity of a corporation, which can be called inside value, and market value is 
well illustrated by the insufficiency of meaningful corporate data.476  For 
example, corporate accounting reflects the net book value of assets and 
residual earnings for a corporation, “which is original cost less depreciation 
computed according to some arbitrary schedule.”477  This is only an 
approximation of the true value of some of the assets.  For example, it was 
reported that Heinz’s stated book value for its outstanding shares of stock was 
$1.99 billion or $3.42 per share in April of 2003.478  Concurrently, Heinz’s 
common shares were selling at $30 per share for a capitalized market value of 
$10.5 billion.479 
Valuation of intangibles is part of the reason for the huge discrepancy 
between inside value and market value.  Book value does not include most 
intangible capital, which is comprised of visual assets, like patents and 
trademarks, and also almost invisible assets like trade secrets, goodwill, 
customer service, headquarters efficiencies, profits lost in order to establish 
new markets, and all of the training and skills acquired by an established work 
force.480  It has been estimated that the value of intangible capital may be as 
high as one-third of all business assets.481  Despite its importance, the value of 
intangible capital is merely conjecture.482 
Due to the immeasurability of intangible capital, one cannot determine true 
value, one can only observe the value of corporate assets or the corporate 
enterprise by viewing the market value of the corporation’s outstanding 
shares.483  It is the stock market price that has real consequences to the 
                                                                                                                 
269, at 45.  Market risk takes into consideration the fluctuation in prices due to the economy as a 
whole as opposed to individual corporate concerns.  See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 162.  
Unlike unique risk, market risk is not diversifiable.  Id. at 162 & n.27. 
 474. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 421, at 6–7. 
 475. Berle, supra note 363, at 28. 
 476. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 419. 
 477. See id. at 317. 
 478. Id. at 366. 
 479. Id. 
 480. See Fullerton & Lyon, supra note 146, at 64, 67–68. 
 481. See id. at 74. 
 482. See id. at 68, 72, 74. 
 483. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 316–17. 
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shareholder.484  Standard finance texts tell us to trust market value, claiming 
that the market reveals the true value of shares.485  In other words, the current 
price is neither under- nor overvalued.  An investor, therefore, is concerned 
only with relative value, which is the value of shares today as opposed to their 
value yesterday.486  The relationship between economic rents and share value 
is only a matter of speculation.487  Consequently, it can be concluded that 
shareholders are neither particularly interested in economic rents nor 
significantly affected by them.488   
Shareholders look for a normal return on their investment, calculated as the 
sum of a risk-free return and a risk premium.489  This normal return would be 
exempt from taxation under a corporate cash flow tax, resulting in only one 
layer of taxation at the shareholder level.490  To the extent that economic rents 
trickle down to shareholders, they are unexpected windfalls.491  In many cases, 
rents may not accrue to shareholders at all.492  This is because there are several 
constituents that vie for economic rents, including equity capital (dividends), 
debt (contingent interest),493 and labor (greater wages and benefits).494  
Management is in a unique position to capture rents through compensation in 
the form of disproportionate salaries, non-taxed benefits, and stock options, 
translating their efforts into capital return.495  Thus, economic rents present the 
one fair base for taxing the profits of a corporation, even if those rents are 
taxed twice.496 
                                                 
 484. Id. at 75 (describing investors’ expectations for stock growth when observing stock 
prices during the present day). 
 485. See, e.g., id. at 350 (stating that stock prices can be trusted in an “efficient market . . . 
for they impound all available information about the value of each security”); id. at 348. 
 486. Id. at 348. 
 487. Id. at 281 (discussing the factors that influence the sustainability of economic rents). 
 488. See Elkins & Hanna, supra note 160, at 101–02 (describing the nature of supernormal 
returns); see also supra notes 434–35 and accompanying text. 
 489. See supra notes 324–29 and accompanying text. 
 490. See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text. 
 491. See supra notes 434–35 and accompanying text. 
 492. See supra notes 452–58 and accompanying text. 
 493. Theoretically a loan of debt capital tax has a zero NPV because the rate is exactly 
equivalent to the opportunity cost of capital.  See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 430, at 332–33.  
Certain creditors, however, may be in the position to bargain for a share of economic rents in 
addition to a normal return on capital. 
 494. Even customers might vie for a portion of the rents, but to the extent customers get 
better prices, we would hesitate to classify these as rents.  See, e.g., Elkins & Hanna, supra note 
160, at 101 (arguing that supernormal returns should be defined as “returns on labor or as 
windfalls”). 
 495. Consequently, there may be a case for limiting deductions for management 
compensation in a cash flow system because excessive compensation represents economic rents.  
On the other hand, since debt and equity receive identical treatment under a cash flow tax, it is 
irrelevant whether rents are paid to shareholders or creditors.  See supra note 159 and 
accompanying text. 
 496. See supra notes 429–31 and accompanying text. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the case for taxing economic rents to 
corporations satisfies the important goals of corporate taxation: providing 
revenue and regulating corporations in a way that can control management.  A 
separate cash flow tax on corporations taxes them in a way that directly reflects 
the benefits they derive from society, which are fairly reflected in the tax 
base.497  In general, cash flow taxes work in a way that is non-distortive and 
economically efficient.498  Although all comprehensive cash flow taxes are 
taxes on economic rents, a destination-based cash flow tax includes only those 
rents that are clearly accessible by a nation because they are inextricably bound 
to a nation’s domestic consumption.499   
Recent data shows that corporate taxes as a percentage of GDP have 
substantially declined since the 1960s.500  This decline is despite the fact that 
corporations still account for over 80% of business activity in America.501 
President Barack Obama’s tax-reform plan is to broaden the corporate tax base 
by reducing or eliminating tax preferences while lowering corporate tax rates 
to accomplish overall neutrality.502  Revenue neutrality will not reverse this 
decline.  Even loophole-closing with the existing tax rates would not 
significantly reverse the trend because tax preferences only account for 
approximately 8.6% of corporate taxable income.503 
Other factors account for the decline in revenue more directly.  First, many 
large businesses have escaped the corporate tax by using pass-through 
nontaxable entities.504  Second, an increasing number of corporations use a 
higher percentage of debt-financing rather than equity financing, resulting in a 
negative corporate tax on business profits.505  Third, national borders are 
dissolving when seen from the perspective of multinational corporations and 
global economics.506  Consequently, nation-states’ international tax regimes 
are disintegrating in the face of the challenges of international tax 
competition.507  The taxation of the foreign earnings of U.S. multinationals and 
foreign corporations doing business in the United States is the result of a 
flawed international system that exacerbates transfer pricing gambits and debt 
                                                 
 497. See supra text accompanying notes 425–28. 
 498. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 499. See supra Part II.B (arguing that “only a destination-based cash flow tax will yield a 
largely unavoidable corporate tax”). 
 500. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 501. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 502. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 503. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 504. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 505. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 506. See Barker, supra note 17, at 171–80. 
 507. See id. 
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financing.508  Imports substantially reduce tax revenue.509  Proposed 
international tax solutions include source-based territorial taxation,510 but 
neither loophole-closing nor the adoption of a territorial income tax can cure 
the basic problems of corporate tax. 
This Article has outlined the need for a paradigm shift from a corporate 
income tax to a corporate cash flow tax.  Unlike other cash flow proposals that 
suggest an origin-based cash flow tax for all,511 cumulative research indicates 
that the adoption of a destination-based cash flow tax solely for corporations 
and other large businesses is the optimal corporate tax scheme.512  A 
destination-based cash flow tax for corporations and other large businesses 
would practically eliminate the problems of the corporate income tax, 
including tax preferences to international tax issues.  It accomplishes this by 
taxing all gains from U.S. consumption, both real and financial, leaving the 
taxation of labor income to workers and the normal returns from capital to 
investors under the income tax system.513  A destination-based cash flow tax 
reverses the income tax bias for foreign production by taxing all sales for 
domestic consumption while excluding export sales.514  A destination-based 
cash flow tax allows a deduction for all costs other than those for imported 
goods and services.515  It protects the domestic tax base by completely 
removing the foreign element from the equation.516  Cash flow taxes present a 
fair and economically sound base for taxing corporations. 
A cash flow tax on corporations would also benefit shareholders.  Cash flow 
taxes remove the normal return from capital from the corporate tax base by 
equalizing the tax treatment of debt and equity.517  Economic double taxation 
of corporate income would be of no practical importance.  Shareholders would 
have the added bonus of effective information on corporate profitability 
derived directly from corporate income tax returns, which would measure the 
true profit from shareholder’s capital and would be a direct measure of 
management performance.518 
 
 
 
                                                 
 508. See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text. 
 509. See Auerbach et al., supra note 57, at 853–55. 
 510. See supra Part II.B (discussing origin-based and destination-based territorial tax 
systems). 
 511. See Barker, supra note 14, at 690–93. 
 512. See supra notes 194–200 and accompanying text. 
 513. See supra notes 194–200 and accompanying text. 
 514. See supra notes 194, 196–97 and accompanying text. 
 515. See Barker, supra note 14, at 695. 
 516. See id. 
 517. See id. at 689. 
 518. See supra text accompanying notes 425–28. 
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